

'Assassins' Allegation Is Denied

WILLIAMSBURG (UPI) — A Central Intelligence Agency spokesman has labeled "utterly untrue" a published report that a camp in Virginia was used for CIA training in nuclear weapons.

The spokesman also denied "unequivocally" that secret-shrouded Camp Peary in York County was used to train CIA agents in assassination techniques.

The report was published in the weekly Virginia Gazette, which based its story on an interview with a former CIA man.

The newspaper published here said Camp Peary is a secret CIA training base and has been for years. Agents are trained in assassination, demolition, parachutes, wire-tapping and intelligence-gathering and have experimented with what the former CIA agent called "mini-nuclear bombs."

The one-time CIA man is Joe Maggio, who said he was trained at the camp for six months. Maggio has written a novel about the CIA entitled "Company Man."

The CIA spokesman said Maggio had been "fired for cause from a Central Intelligence Agency training program." The spokesman denied the charges about assassination training and said "the allegation about mini-nuclear weapons in any CIA training program or use by the agency is utterly untrue."

Maggio said he was fired for free-lance writing he did while working for the CIA, not because of the way he did his work with the agency.

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DEC 27 1972

Rand McNally Publishes CIA-compiled China Atlas

Free Press - Gannett Service
WASHINGTON — The unique atlas of China, originally compiled by the Central Intelligence Agency for the President's visit there earlier this year, proved so popular the government published it at \$5.25 a copy.

But if you look closely in commercial bookstores you'll find Rand McNally is selling an all-but-identical atlas "from materials prepared by the U.S. government" at \$4.95 paperback, \$10 hardbound.

Piracy? Plagiarism? Copy catting?

None of these. Rand McNally, for the sum which one executive recalls as roughly \$1,500, bought the government films from which it was able to make printing plates for the atlas.

Anybody can do the same. The government does not copyright such material, on the theory it belongs to the public, so any publisher can put it out for his own profit if he wishes.

The CIA's atlas is unusual in that much of the information — on climate and railroads, for example — is presented in comparison to the United States and occasionally some other nations. The maps and charts were produced just for the volume.

Neither the CIA nor the Government Printing Office has any idea of how much the research, map work, writing and printing cost ran, so there is no way to assess how big a bargain Rand McNally got. One thing is sure — it was many times \$1,500.

Rand McNally made only three

changes: Its cover is glossy black, the CIA-GPO edition is white; it is slightly smaller than the government edition; and the populations of the major world cities have been changed somewhat.

The original was in eight colors, and Rand McNally probably would prefer to hold it down to four colors. But it was forced to print in eight.

Rand McNally printed 15,000 copies, a spokesman said. The CIA's original printing was 5,000 and then the volume was turned over to the GPO which, on an outside contract, printed 35,000 more.

Rand McNally managed to get the book out in time for Christmas. The government version has been out for most of the year. Although the Rand McNally version isn't yet selling like hotcakes, the spokesman believes the company may have to go into a second printing.

Such procedures are common in publishing. Very often reports

by government commissions are whipped into paperback form, provided with an introduction and sold on newsstands by private publishers.

When an interviewer suggested the atlas represented a considerable private dividend on the taxpayer's investment, the Rand McNally spokesman said: "We pay a lot of taxes, too."

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Camp Peary Exposed
As CIA Training Base

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CIA Has 67 Secret Florida License Tags

By DUANE BRADFORD
Sun Capital Bureau

TALLAHASSEE The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has been issued 67 secret Florida license tags, the registration records of which are kept from public scrutiny in violation of Florida law.

The agency is one of dozens of federal, state, and county and city governments throughout Florida that had received 3,077 such secret tags as of Nov. 2, according to Department of Highway Safety records.

Florida law requires such records to be open for inspection, but the absence of any law shielding anonymity of the 3,000-plus tag holders has not stopped public officials such as Motor Vehicle Division Director John D. Calvin from refusing to reveal any records on the secret license tags.

One of the secret tags is held by Florida Education Commissioner Floyd T. Christian on an automobile owned by the state. Christian has said he got the tag because his predecessor, former Supt. of Public Instruction Thomas D. Bailey, had such a tag. The tag costs only 50 cents a year. A secret tag cannot be traced by a citizen. If an inquiry is made, the Motor Vehicle Division tells the inquirer that the tag record is "out of the files" and asks that the inquirer give a name and telephone number so the information can be telephoned when found.

The division then notifies the secret tag holder of the inquiry being made about the automobile bearing the secret tag number and is given the name of the person inquiring about the tag.

Secretary of State Richard Stone had such a secret tag on a state car until a reporter spotted Mrs. Stone driving the vehicle at a Tallahassee shopping center. Stone said he removed the tag.

In a memo prepared for Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles executive director Ralph Davis, the 3,077 secret tags issues as of last Nov. 2 were broken down in the following manner:

Federal government agencies, 715; counties, 911; state agencies, 443;

The memo identified only the agencies and number of tags issued.

Among other federal agencies issued tags, the Department of Defense (Air Force, Army and Navy) have received 103 secret tags for use on its vehicles. With the CIA tags, Defense has received 170 secret tags.

The Border Patrol has one such tag; FBI, 304; Immunization and Naturalization, 47; Bureau of Narcotics, 51, and Labor Relations, two

That totals 405 for the Department of Justice. The confidential tag is designed for use on law enforcement vehicles under circumstances where the identity of the enforcement agency is desired to be kept secret. Such vehicles are used for surveillance work.

The Treasury Department has 216 such tags with Customs having 112; Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 57; and Secret Service 47.

The Department of Interior (Fish and Wildlife) has 17 tags; Federal Communications Commission two; General Service Administration, 94; Internal Revenue Service, 83; Post Office, 21.

While there were 911 tags issued to various county officials throughout Florida, the standout on the list as the one secret tag showed issued to the Pinellas County School Board. It could not be learned who held that tag and for what purpose.

Many sheriffs use confidential tags, including 29 in Alachua County.

The cities of Pensacola, Plant City, Ocala, Ft. Lauderdale and Ft. Myers - among the more populated areas of Florida - are not listed as using secret tags on any of their vehicles.

But Kissimmee, with a population of 7,119, has seven such secret tags. At that rate, St. Petersburg should have 216 such secret tags. But it has 49. Sunrise Golf Village City, with a population of 7,403, has two

such tags and Maitland, with a similar population, has four confidential tags.

Palm Beach has two, Pinellas Park 5, Riviera Beach 9, Auburndale 3, Bartow 3, Belleair 1, and Clearwater 14 confidential tag numbers for vehicles of underterminable use.

Dunedin has two secret tags while Gainesville has 27, Holmes Beach (with a population of 2,700) 10, Lakeland has 8 such tags, Largo 2.

Tallahassee, with a population of 71,000, has 26 such secret tags.

Among state agencies, 132 secret tags are issued to the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Beverage; the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (Florida Highway Patrol), 100; and Department of Law Enforcement 127 such tags.

The Division of Animal Industry of the Department of Agriculture has three such tags. One reason for the tags, it was reported, was to investigate cattle rustling.

The secret tag issue blossomed earlier this year when a reporter in Gainesville observed a person being clubbed during disturbance at the University of Florida. The reporter noted the tag number of the car drive by the officers. The identity of the car's owner could not be traced because of the secrecy policy established without benefit of law.

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WASHINGTON STAR

13 DEC 1972

Mrs. Hunt Had Big Flight

By JOSEPH VOLZ and
JAMES R. POLK

Star-News Staff Writers

Mrs. E. Howard Hunt, wife of a suspect in the Watergate break-in and bugging case, was insured for \$250,000 on a flight which crashed in Chicago last week, killing her and 44 other passengers.

Reliable sources told The Star-News that Mrs. Dorothy Hunt named her husband as the beneficiary for a \$100,000 Mutual of Omaha policy and two \$75,000 policies, all purchased at Washington National Airport where the flight originated.

Mrs. Hunt's \$100,000 accidental death policy represented about one-fourth of all the insurance coverage written here by Mutual for that flight.

Sources said both Hunt and his wife regularly took out high insurance policies when flying.

Mrs. Hunt also was carrying \$10,000 in cash which her husband says was going to be invested with a relative, Harold C. Carlstead, a Chicago accountant with interests in motels.

No Apparent Link

Hunt and six others are scheduled to be tried in U.S. District Court next month on charges stemming from the June 17 break-in at the Demo-

cratic Party's Watergate headquarters.

The U.S. attorney's office is particularly interested in the \$100 bills Mrs. Hunt was carrying. However, a check of the serial numbers on the bills with those which Watergate suspect Bernard Barker withdrew from a Florida bank after cashing Republican campaign checks shows no apparent link.

Mrs. Hunt paid about \$10 for her insurance policies and reportedly was insured for similar amounts on previous flights.

Her husband said he did not make the flight because "I would have to get a court order to leave the Washington area."

Hunt flew to Chicago after receiving word his wife's plane had crashed. Reliable sources say he insured himself for "slightly more" than \$250,000 on his flight. Sources said both Hunt and his wife regularly took out high insurance policies when flying.

Single Roll of Bills

Mutual of Omaha still has not been contacted by anyone representing the Hunt family to file a claim even though the crash was five days ago.

The \$10,000 found in Mrs. Hunt's purse was contained in a single roll of \$100 bills

wrapped with a rubber band.

A check of the serial numbers showed many of the bills may have come from a bank in the New York City area.

A total of \$5,300 in \$100 bills had been seized by police in the arrest of five of the Watergate suspects inside the Democratic headquarters.

That money was linked to Nixon campaign funds when those serial numbers were traced to a Miami bank where Barker had cashed checks totaling \$114,000 in contributions.

The packet of \$100 bills that Barker is known to have picked up was part of a series from F 02457101 to F 02457600. Only two of the \$100 bills carried by Mrs. Hunt bore F numbers and these, F 02322900 A and F 03873745 A were unrelated to the Barker money.

'Good Luck, FS'

The serial numbers on the other bills found in the dead woman's purse were spread among federal banking districts throughout the entire nation, indicating most of the money was in used bills and therefore hard to trace.

But investigators did find one group of new bills in sequence from G 08075077 A through B 08075081 A which originated with a bank in the New York City area.

The B letter, identifying the funds with the Federal Reserve district for New York, appeared on four other sets of bills in the roll.

Among the \$100 bills carried by Mrs. Hunt was one that reportedly bore the inscription: "Good luck, FS."

The initials are the same as those of Frank Sturgis, another of the suspects arrested inside the Watergate. But Sturgis, reached in Miami, denied flatly that he had written the phrase.

"That is not my signature," he said.

Fired From Job

Sturgis would not comment on another published report that a passport in the name of "Edward Hamilton," found in his possession in the June arrest, had been issued by the CIA to Hunt.

Hunt was a CIA employee before becoming a White House counsel. Sturgis, a former soldier of fortune who has

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Insurance

used several names in his lifetime, at first told police last summer his name was Hamilton.

Sturgis, who was active in the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, also declined to say whether he had ever worked for the CIA. "No one ever admits that," he said.

Sturgis was employed as a salesman for the Pan American Aluminum Corp. in Miami until this week when he was dismissed after a federal prosecutor visited the company to ask for his payroll records.

U.S. Atty. Earl J. Silbert has spent the past week in Miami, contacting members of the Cuban exile community as potential witnesses in the Watergate trial scheduled to begin Jan. 8. Sources said the company asked Sturgis to leave after Silbert made an inquiry there.

19 DEC 1972

New Watergate Dimension?

By THOMAS B. ROSS
Chicago Sun-Times Service

A fake passport, produced by the Central Intelligence Agency for former White House consultant E. Howard Hunt Jr., was being carried by one of the suspects at the time of the Watergate break-in, investigators have disclosed.

The passport, made out in the name of "Edward Hamilton" — the same initials as Hunt's — reportedly was found on Frank Sturgis when he was arrested at Democratic National Committee headquarters in June.

The disclosure of the passport yesterday added a dimension to the case: The possibility that current CIA employees were involved in political espionage. The CIA has repeatedly assured Congress that its fake documents are kept under tight control.

Hunt and several of the others under indictment have acknowledged they once worked for the CIA, but have asserted they were no longer in its employ at the time of the Watergate incident.

Hunt's wife was killed in the United Air Lines crash in Chicago on Friday. Her purse was found to contain more than \$10,000 in cash. Police reported that one of the bills bore the written inscription: "Good Luck. FS" — the same initials as Sturgis'.

Sturgis has never been identified as a direct employe of the CIA, but was known to have had extensive agency

contacts in Miami. An ex-Marine, he fought with Fidel Castro in Cuba and was rewarded with the gambling casino concession in Havana after Castro won.

But the two men had an early falling out, and Sturgis went over to the Cuban exile community in Miami. He was once arrested on a boat off British Honduras in what he described as an attempted "commando raid" on Cuba.

A soldier of fortune, he is believed to have used several pseudonyms besides that of Edward Hamilton. He was born Frank Fiorini in Norfolk, Va., but adopted the name of his stepfather.

Hunt was hired as a White House consultant by Charles W. Colson, special counsel to President Nixon. He openly declares in his Who's Who listing that he has operated under a number of pseudonyms — Robert Dietrich, John Baxter and Gordon Davis.

The federal indictment charges that Hunt was present on the night of the Watergate break-in, but left before the police arrived and apprehended the five persons inside the Democratic headquarters. He was linked to the case through a \$25,000 cash fund, a campaign contribution to the Committee for the Re-election of the President.

Investigators said the fake passport and the possible CIA role in the break-in would probably be explored at the trial scheduled to begin next month.

The CIA is prohibited by law from conducting any operations within the United States and, of course, is proscribed

from taking part in domestic politics. It is known, however, to have been involved with the Cuban community and with other anti-Communist exile groups in U.S. cities.

The investigators said they did not have a plausible theory as to why Mrs. Hunt was carrying so much cash.

STATINTL

BY KATE HOLLIDAY

AGENCIES SHUT ON WEEKENDS

No One's Minding the Store

STATINTL

One recent Sunday, I became somewhat frantic trying to discover the latest special delivery postal rate. A call to the main Post Office downtown brought a man's voice on a lengthy recording. Its implication was that no sane employee would touch even so much as a presidential invitation after noon on Saturday, and that it was particularly unseemly of me to expect any assistance on the Lord's Day.

Hmmmm. Then I thought to try the Federal Information Center, listed among the "most frequently called" of the government agencies in the phone book. Another recording, this one advising me sternly that the office was open from 8 to 4 on weekdays (the last two words stressed). Foiled again.

I read through the entire list of federal offices, seeking a glimmer, until I met my match at the end. The notice read, "If unable to find the desired office listed above, call the Federal Information Center."

What's going on here? Who's running the store? It's simple: No one is—on weekends.

Kate Holliday is a Los Angeles writer who has contributed to such magazines as Reader's Digest, True and McCall's. She has experienced plenty of emergencies in her time, particularly while serving as a war correspondent in Korea.

Anyone who wants help from a federal, state, county or city bureau on Saturday or Sunday, with few exceptions, is out of luck. Despite our nation's massive Civil Service contingent on all levels, if you have a medical emergency, a parole emergency, a dead animal in your back yard, or merely want information, forget it. Most of the government is off till Monday morning.

There are some exceptions—the FBI, most police and fire outfits, as well as the Secret Service. But, oddly, no one answers at the CIA or the state fire marshal's office.

The Federal Immigration and Naturalization Service has a line that takes police calls only, and the woman who answers tells you that, no matter how dire your trouble, "There's not a thing you can do until Monday morning." The Earthquake Disaster Service and the Veterans Administration Clinic for Medical Information don't even deign to do that.

You're not much better off with the state health people. The Medical Information listing doesn't answer, nor does the Narcotic Outpatient Clinic. And, when I called the emergency number of the Public Health Administration, I got no reply at all. So I called it again, and a man, who came on the line informed me he was the janitor.

"Do you take emergency calls?" I asked.

"No," he said, kindly, "but I can write a note and leave it somewhere for you, so they'll get it tomorrow."

I made further tests in a two-hour session at my phone, letting each call ring at least seven times. On the health scene, only the county emergency people are on the job—if you need them on a weekend. (Yes, I know there are receiving hospitals in the area, but what if someone doesn't have a car? Is too ill to

move? Too mute to signal assistance? Just wants fast information on a poison, say?) For the county, a woman responds on 629-2451 with a cheery, "We're here!"

The county has made a big thing of its 24-hour-a-day "Good Neighbor" program of providing emergency foster homes for children. Although there are two listings for it in the phone book, neither answered at 3:45 on a Sunday afternoon.

Speaking of children, when I called Griffith Park to ask about the procedure in reporting one lost, a ranger said two security officers were there after 5:30, "but they're rarely in the office to man the phone." Dandy.

A woman in Long Beach nearly went out of her mind a few years ago when, during a holiday parade, a horse died and was dragged onto her lawn lest it disrupt traffic. She was told, as I was, that the animal pickup service did not send anyone out after 2:30 p.m., horse or no horse. They'd come the next day—maybe.

If the military and protective forces can routinely assign duty officers over the weekend, why can't the state, county, city and federal agencies follow suit? They might not only save a few lives but keep hundreds of ordinary citizens like me from climbing the walls.

Nevertheless, there is a glimmer of light at the end of the tunnel. Last August, Gov. Reagan signed a bill that will establish 911 as a statewide number to call in case of emergency any day of the week—but not till 1982. (The law stipulates that pay phones must be converted for free access to police, firemen and ambulance services.)

This is a step in the right direction, but I'm not exactly a spring chicken, and anything might happen during the next 10 years.

If it does, oh Lord, please let it happen to me on a Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday or Thursday. Now that the four-day work week is coming up, I've even grown scared of Friday.

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Intrigue: Eastern Shore creep?

By John Schmaldeke
Dover Bureau Chief

Those hadn't been easy weeks, Durrell recalled. You were tested for leadership and ingenuity in dozens of grueling ways.

"There were no rules of fair play at The Farm. Every dirty trick in the book was spewed at you. You trusted no one—not your fellow candidates, who would cajole you into friendship, nor the instructors, who could use a personal attitude to suddenly turn on you and slide a knife across your throat."

This description of The Farm is from a spy thriller by Edward S. Aarons—"Assignment: Madeleine."

The protagonist is one Sam Durrell, the best spy in the super-secret K Section of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The Farm, according to Aarons' long series of books on Durrell, is located somewhere on the Eastern Shore of Maryland. It's a place where the CIA trains its best agents.

"A thin rain was falling, turning the Chesapeake, masked beyond the village of Prince John (fictional) in Maryland, into a dimpled place of fallen gray steel."

Durrell had driven over from Washington for breakfast with Delmore Padgett, with a long winter's weekend ahead of them. "Come here, just the two of them," Aarons writes in "Assignment: Padgett."

The Farm is also supposed to be a place where over-worked K Section agents go for rest and recuperation.

But does it really exist?

In 1952, the Soviet government released Francis Gary Powers, the American U-2 spy plane pilot, from prison. It was rumored that the CIA had taken him to a secret of a large training center in Talbot County for reeducation.

Could be that it took a lot of time for the American public to hear that the CIA was training its agents. It would seem unlikely

that The Farm would be listed in Maryland tourist guidebooks.

BUT if it exists, it's a 63.24 acre piece of land nestled along the Choptank River about 15 miles southwest of Easton.

It's on a spit of land known as Benoni Point. A red brick mansion, a pier and a few out-buildings can be seen from the air. Nothing but a mailbox with no name on it and a "no trespassing" sign can be seen from the road.

The land lies along a dirt road which has no name and is not included on official Maryland highway maps. It forks to the right off the road leading to the Bellevue-Oxford Ferry.

From the air, one can see small boats pulled up along the tree-lined shore. There are trees all around the place; nothing but trees all around the place; nothing but trees can be seen from ground level.

If Aarons is to be believed and if K Section ("an agency so secret that even the government doesn't know about it") has a hand in the place, curious reporters aren't likely to get the red-carpet welcome.

FIRST things first, however. If one is on a mission looking for a secret hideaway, one must be careful how one handles oneself.

"I'm looking for a list of all federal land in Talbot County," one begins by saying to the clerk in the county courthouse.

"We don't have too much," she says pulling open a drawer stuffed with tax maps.

She talks about a Navy lighthouse and a historic monument of some sort.

Then, just as the reporters are about to leave, the clerk remembers something. In true spy novel fashion, she finds a tiny map at the bottom of the drawer.

"The government owns some land here, but they won't let you in," she says. One hears many of these things in the life of the clerk and

rats a "that sounds like what we're looking for" with a quick wink.

After a few more minutes of laying out a route, the newsmen are off.

DRIVING down the well-marked road, one sees farmers (agents in disguise?) working in fields. There are signs everywhere in the area that say "No Trespassing. Survivors will be prosecuted." Using the highly refined reasoning powers a reporter must have, one figures out that the place with no name on the mailbox and the simple "no trespassing" sign must be the government land.

The lane into the place also has that well-policed appearance characteristic of military-type land.

Next-door-neighbor George Lewis Jr. (another agent? one wonders) is pleasant when asked about the place.

"I've been over there," he says, noting that he knows the "cave-labor."

"They've got some big dogs over there," his wife says pointedly.

BELIEVING the old saw about discretion being the better part of valor, one decides it might be safer to get a look from the air.

"You government men?" the pilot asks.

We finally confess that we're reporters. He says everyone in the area assumes the place is a CIA rest camp.

Perhaps a phone call to the CIA might answer some questions.

"351-1100," the receptionist answers in a confidential voice. Even though the number is listed under the Central Intelligence Agency in the Washington, D.C., phone book.

no one every mentions the name.

remembers something. In true spy novel fashion, she finds a tiny map at the bottom of the drawer.

"The government owns some land here, but they won't let you in," she says. One hears many of these things in the life of the clerk and

ONE feels that in the best interests of national security, one should refrain from mentioning the name also.

"I'm calling about some land in Maryland you, er, your agency, I guess, owns."

At first they say they don't know anything about the land but promise to check. A while later, a call from a "spokesman" comes back.

It turns out the CIA does own the land. "It's used for management seminars it's training, but on the management side, the "spokesman" says.

"It's not a spooky place at all," he says reassuringly. "It's not used for guerrilla warfare."

Then how about a look at the place?

The CIA has a standing policy of no tours through any of its establishments, the spokesman says cordially.

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continued

21 NOV 1972

STATINTL

Bratwurst at C.I.A. Cafeteria Sample of New Capital Fare

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 20—If you could get security clearance, you could treat yourself to a German-style lunch of bratwurst with sauerkraut, or knackwurst with red kohl, at a little out-of-the-way spot called Die Wunder Deli Bar.

Security clearance to get into a delicatessen? Absolutely, when it's in the cafeteria of the Central Intelligence Agency, tucked away in the woods of Langley, Va., just northwest of Washington.

But say you're more the meat-and-potatoes type. If you had business to do at the State Department, you might drop into the cafeteria there to pick out a likely looking rib eye steak, have it charbroiled to order by an agile grillman who wears a black 10-gallon hat, and sit down to a hearty meal with french fries and sliced tomatoes.

All this is possible these days because of a move by the Government to make more inviting the 145,000 lunches that it serves every day to Federal workers in the Washington area—a task that compares to feeding the entire population of Paterson, N. J.

A Mixed Reaction

The remodeled State Department cafeteria, with its orange-paneled pillars and side walls the color of underripe bananas, is the most recently completed. Along with the grill, which also serves up barbecued spareribs and chicken platters, there is a seafood line that includes scallops and fish and a shrimp basket with french fries and coleslaw.

The reaction of customers has been mixed.

"Well, it's brighter, and they've put in some new equip-

ment," an executive secretary in the foreign aid area said over lunch one day. "But I was satisfied the way it was before."

On the other hand, a young foreign aid specialist who had just emerged from the grill area was happy about the whole thing.

"I've been spending more money on lunch because I'm more attracted to the food," he said. "I used to spend about 80 cents; now I average about \$1.30, \$1.60 a day."

The improvement program was begun about three years ago, when the Government's housekeeping agency, the General Services Administration, discovered that the 35 cafeterias that are serviced under one contract in Government buildings here were losing customers and money.

A Side Benefit

The nonprofit corporation that has run the cafeterias for going on 50 years was told to bring in some new management talent and fresh ideas to improve the food and surroundings.

"We're trying to get away from the institutional stereotypes—the long lines, green-gray walls, the dull appearance of foods—and create as much atmosphere as we can, like the cook in the cowboy hat," explained Frank Capps, the G.S.A. official in charge of Government buildings.

The trick was to provide all this and still keep the meals reasonably priced by the standards of Government workers who, according to cafeteria managers, seem to think of lunch as a side benefit of their employment.

No flies on CIA

Animals have for some time been pressed into service to aid the American war effort. The US Navy has trained dolphins, sea lions, and whales for underwater military roles. Some reports have suggested that skunks, seagulls, and bats have also been used willy-nilly in defence of the fatherland. The military monthly magazine of the Algerian armed forces, El-Djeich, recently went one better. It claims that the CIA has recruited those to which have been attached microscopic transmitters to act as spies.

These winged agents have, of course, the advantage of being able to penetrate innocently to the innermost circles of the enemy's governmental and military establishments — or at least to the kitchens and dustbins. It is known that they have a touch of the kamikaze about them, which even China's kill-a-fly-a-day drive (instituted as part of the National Programme for Agricultural Development in 1956) would not be able to beat. Our gallant fly heroes are able to fulfil their missions by continuing to transmit from beyond the grave, after being swatted. From this it may be safely assumed that we shall soon be seeing President Nixon awarding the widows of these selfless patriots transistorised Purple Hearts on the White House lawn.

Security, job urgency named top factors in intelligence printing

Security of the work and urgency of printed jobs are the two paramount peculiarities involved in the production of printing for intelligence, J. Arnold Shaw, printing services division chief, Central Intelligence Agency, told Craftsmen at their 53rd annual convention in Cleveland.

The statutory responsibility calling for the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, Shaw related, makes the various intelligence producing offices captive clientele to the CIA's printing facilities. "They must come to us for all their work and we must be able to handle whatever they give us and within the time frame necessary for the material," he stated.

An extensive security clearance of several months duration is performed on all employees, and even though turnover is low compared with other plants, continual processing must be conducted in order to fill vacancies.

Various work areas inside the CIA printing plant are secured and vaults are available for protection of in-process material. "Simply having a top security clearance does not automatically grant access to all material, the printing chief remarked. "Only those having an obvious need to see material in-process are permitted to do so.

"Strict rules are followed in accounting for distribution of each document and assuring that only authorized courier channels are used. Even waste from the plant must be disposed of in a secure way."

The product of CIA is informa-

tion and in keeping up with the increasing need for currency in intelligence production it is necessary to maintain a modern and progressive plant as well as an awareness of the new technology in all forms of information handling, Shaw said.

Production equipment costing in excess of \$2½ million gives the agency the ability to produce all types of reports, charts, books, process color photographs, and other material of the highest graphics quality. Process cameras up to 48-in. size, phototypesetting and line-casting machines, two-color offset presses, and a fully equipped bindery are located in the main plant which employs 135 people on a two shift operation. An average of 3,500 to 4,000 job requests are received each month, from the CIA's customers setting the delivery date.

Although the CIA has explored the feasibility of having some of its classified work printed outside the plant, security considerations and urgency of production create a situation which makes it almost impossible for a private printing firm to do the jobs on a contract basis. Shaw remarked that a recent privately prepared report showed that the CIA is producing the work at something less than one-half of what a commercial plant would be expected to bid for the job.

For the future, Shaw visualizes an integrated and automated text processing system which will enable, without separate and special keyboarding, getting text information into machine language and into computer storage. The system will be able to recall text back on computer printout or soft display, as well as compose reports, perform editorial and proofreading functions, and produce fully formatted typeset pages in a matter of minutes or hours rather than days.



Wiretap 'Pros' View Democrats' HQ 'Bugs'

By Ronald Kessler

Washington Post Staff Writer

Experts skilled in the art of wiretapping and bugging say each has his own preferred techniques for carrying out their appointed missions, but that none of the methods bears any resemblance to those used a week ago yesterday in the abortive bugging attempt at Democratic National Committee headquarters.

Although the methods favored by the professionals differ, the common thread running through all of them is that they are calculated to provide reliable, high-quality voice transmission using the simplest and smallest available devices to minimize the risk of detection.

A look at some of these methods—all illegal except when carried out by law enforcement officers armed with court orders—provides some insight into the current state of the art of wiretapping and bugging.

"This is a results-oriented business," says one old-time professional. "You don't get paid for building exotic devices. You get paid for conversations," he says.

Considerable publicity has been generated by bugging devices hidden in martini olives or highly sophisticated bugs that don't require physical entry into the premises to be bugged.

One, said to be developed by the Central Intelligence Agency, trips a switch in a standard telephone to make the instrument an open microphone, transmitting room conversations and telephone calls down the telephone wire to monitors miles away. The switch is tripped by placing a radio frequency wave on the telephone wire at any location outside the home or office being bugged.

Another device, still being developed by government intelligence agencies, uses a laser beam to send

vibrations bouncing off window panes. The sound waves from the windows modulate the light waves from the laser, and the modulated light waves are translated back into sound.

A third device, once implanted in a telephone, can be activated from anywhere in the world by simply dialing the number of the telephone and placing a tone of a specific frequency on the line.

Each of these devices has drawbacks, not the least of which is that the clarity of transmission doesn't compare with that of more conventional bugs planted inside the premises where the conversations are taking place.

"When you go into this, you have to do it right, and that means breaking and entering," says Allan D. Bell Jr., a former high-level military intelligence wiretapper and debugger who has worked with the CIA and Federal Bureau of Investigation on bugging matters.

Bell, who heads Dektor Counterintelligence & Security Inc., a Springfield manufacturer of de-bugging devices, says that if he were assigned to bug the Democratic headquarters, he would probably choose from one of three approaches.

If only a few days of listening were needed, Bell says, he would conceal a fully self-sufficient radio transmitter the size of a sugar cube under a conference table or desk. The beauty of such a device, he notes, is that the one responsible for installing it generally cannot be apprehended unless caught in the act.

For more permanent installations, he says, he would wire a telephone in the room to be bugged so that it becomes an open microphone. The room conversations and telephone calls would be transmitted in the telephone equipment

to a remote listening post, perhaps miles away.

A third possibility, he says, would be a radio transmitting device hooked up to the electric current in a home or office. The device would be implanted in an electrical fixture, such as a lamp, or could be manufactured as part of a dummy electric outlet wall plate, detectable only by x-ray.

The device would operate permanently on household current and would beam low-frequency waves along the power lines to be picked up by the eavesdropper at any point along the line. Because the radio signal would be generally confined to the power line, Bell says, it would be difficult to detect its presence through conventional de-bugging methods.

Another wiretap expert is Michael J. Morrissey, chief engineer of B. R. Fox, Inc., a Holmes, N. Y., de-bugging company formerly headed by the late Bernard Spindel, who was considered by federal authorities to be the top wiretapper in the country.

Morrissey says he would plant a combined microphone and amplifier the size of a pinhead somewhere along the telephone line or inside the telephone in a room to be bugged. The signal would be led off through the spare wire that comes with most telephone equipment, he says.

Morrissey says he might plant additional pinhead-size microphones in other parts of the room and connect them to the amplifier with invisible electrically conductive fluid painted on the walls or with gold wire thinner than a strand of human hair.

Morrissey, who teaches a course in wiretapping and bugging for law enforcement agencies, says it is important that radio transmitters be hidden in the room.

of being turned off remotely by the listener so that the signals cannot be detected by de-bugging devices.

"When you hear the de-bugging people come in, that's when you pull the switch," Morrissey says.

Another bugging expert, with years of experience working for private parties and government agencies, says any premises to be bugged must be "cased" for several weeks before a break-in attempt is made. Only one man actually enters the room to be wired for sound and installs the devices, he says, but several men are planted outside the office and outside the building to warn the installer by pre-arranged signals if police, burglar alarm dispatchers or security guards drive up.

"The man outside acts like he's drunk or makes up some story or excuse. A minute's delay is all the installer needs to get away," he says.

The men involved never take a room near the bugging scene, the expert says. Instead, two girls are hired to move into a room nearby, and they tape-record the conversations beamed by the radio bugs, he says.

"Girls are the perfect decoy," he says. "No one suspects them, and the equipment is kept in a suitcase that the police can't search without a warrant. This is the way the pros do it," he says.

14 May 1972

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0001000140001-8
10,000 Calls by Revolutionaries

Plan to Snarl Phones Bared

STATINTL

By GORDON D. HALL

(Gordon D. Hall, now in his 26th year of extremist watching, is a regular contributor to the Sunday Herald Traveler)

Starting tomorrow, the spring offensive of the revolutionary Left, thus far a sputtering combination of aimless rhetoric and sporadic violence, will turn to anonymous telephone harassment of local business firms, military installations, and agencies of the federal government.

High on the list of targets are General Electric, Raytheon Company, Polaroid Corporation, and the Boston offices of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Air Force.

The new campaign is known as "Dial for Peace," recently organized in secret by a coalition of revolutionary and pacifist groups.

Trial runs were made at a few plants this past week to test the "practicability" of flooding company switchboards with hostile calls, but the major effort will begin tomorrow morning.

General Electric's Defense Program Division in Lexington is the first big target.

It is hoped that 1000 revolutionaries and their sympathizers will make 10 calls each, the assumption being that 10,000 calls are more than enough to immobilize even the largest corporation.

Callers are being asked either to say "Stop the war," before dialing again to repeat the message, or to ask to speak to plant executives. Ultimately "bottling them up" in extended verbal harassment over the president's escalation of the air war in Indochina.

On Tuesday, the missile systems divisions of the Raytheon Company's Bedford division will be the target.

TO INSURE telephone saturation at the Bedford plant, the "Dial for Peace" organizers have plucked its number from more than a dozen Raytheon telephone listings, and have circulated it in printed form throughout the greater Boston area.

Wednesday's offensive will be directed at the Boston office of the Central Intelligence Agency.

No explanation has been offered for listing the agency's Boston office number which is buried midst hundreds of government listings in the telephone directory.

A more accessible, though different CIA number can be found among the C's in the same directory.

On May 15, telephone calls will be aimed

at the headquarters offices of the U.S. Air Force on Summer street, Boston.

The telephone campaign will end Friday, following all day harassment of Polaroid's main switchboard in Cambridge.

Because of possible legal ramifications, no one group is claiming credit for the organization of "Dial for Peace."

THE MAJOR revolutionary and pacifist groups in Boston and Cambridge readily admit their "familiarity" with the week-long campaign, but are unwilling to say much beyond believing the idea to be a good one.

At the Greater Boston Peace Action Coalition's (GBPAC) Cambridge headquarters last Friday, spokesmen disclaimed origination of the idea to utilize telephone harassment as a feature of the continuing spring offensive, but thought the idea "effective."

GBPAC, a spearhead of this year's spring offensive along with the revolutionary People's Coalition For Peace And Justice (PCPJ), believes the latter group to be the sponsor of the printed instructions outlining the telephone campaign.

Those instructions were widely distributed throughout Boston and Cambridge on Friday.

Printed on vari-colored letter size handbills, the instructions included by name and number, all five daily targets.

Anonymous, the handbills specified that "1,000 people" place 10 calls each, the "10,000" total adding up to a kind of "do-it-yourself" campaign certain "to stop business for a day."

THE HANDBILL'S final line read: "If they won't stop the war, we'll stop them."

At PCPJ's Brookline street, Cambridge headquarters, however, denials were issued Friday that they had put the telephone instructions in circulation.

Like GBPAC, PCPJ spokesmen thought the telephone campaign to be worthwhile, but believed it probably originated at the Cambridge offices of the Quaker American Friends Service Committee (AFSC).

The Friends didn't seem to mind that PCPJ was dropping a hot and possibly illegal potato in their laps, but a woman answering to the name of "Rachel" neither denied nor confirmed that the printed instructions had been run off at their Inman street headquarters offices.

She said she knew all about the telephone instructions and seemed to think that copies were available in AFSC's "peace section," but did not know how to reach them over the weekend.

continued

CIA SPY KIT: CHINA ATLAS PUT ON SALE

WASHINGTON (UPI)

—For \$5.25, any citizen can have his own Central Intelligence Agency document.

The Government Printing Office in Washington is offering for sale 30,000 copies of the CIA's new 82-page, multicolored atlas of the People's Republic of China.

Officials at the GPO said that except for an annual four-volume series listing the broadcasting stations of the world, the atlas was the only CIA document they had produced for sale to the public.

In addition to maps of modern China, the atlas, with the CIA's seal on the cover, also contains historical maps, a number of charts describing the growth of the Chinese economy and a narrative accompanying the maps and charts.

CLEVELAND, OHIO
 PLAIN DEALER
 MAY 12 1972
 M - 409,414
 S - 545,032

CIA Atlas on China Looks Like 'Sellout'

The first Central Intelligence Agency publication ever to be sold by the U.S. Government Printing Office "looks like it might be a sellout," Robert Kling, superintendent of documents, told The Plain Dealer yesterday.

The Government Printing Office already has received more than 6,000 orders for "The People's Republic of China Atlas," an 82-page, six-color book, designed originally as briefing material for President Nixon's trip to Mainland China. It was put on public sale a week ago.

GPO ordered 30,878 copies of the atlas printed, with delivery slated for late May.

Kling, phoned in Washington, said he now believes advance orders could total 25,000, and, if so, "We'll have to go back to press with it."

The atlas, priced at \$5.25, measures 10 1/4 by 17 inches, and contains foldout maps as big as 10 1/4 x 34.

It employs a number of unconventional graphic techniques, in addition to standard regional and thematic maps, charts and photographs, and "is designed as an introduction and general reference aid for those interested in the



People's Republic of China."

The atlas contains comparisons of the United States and mainland (Communist) China to make its statistics more meaningful to the average American.

A CIA spokesman said the agency had never before offered any such publication to the American public.

But, he said, President Nixon showed the atlas to reporters and before live TV cameras before his trip. So the CIA decided to make it public.

Orders for the atlas can be sent to the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

A C.I.A. Atlas of China Goes on Sale for \$5.25

WASHINGTON, May 6 (UPI)

—For \$5.25, any citizen can have his own Central Intelligence Agency document.

The Government Printing Office is offering for sale 30,000 copies of the C.I.A.'s new 82-page, multicolored atlas of the People's Republic of China.

Officials at the printing office said that except for an annual four-volume series listing the broadcasting stations of the world, the atlas was the only C.I.A. document they had produced for sale to the public.

In addition to detailed maps of modern China, the atlas, which has the C.I.A.'s seal on the cover, also contains historical maps, a number of charts depicting the growth of the Chinese economy, and a narrative accompanying the maps and charts.

ADVANCE ORDER FORM

1 MAY 1972

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0001

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

ATLAS

STATINTL

Issued by the Central Intelligence Agency, this colorful publication goes beyond the scope of a conventional atlas. It represents a wider variety of information, including geographic, economic, historical, and cultural data. In the interest of simplicity and clarity, it employs a number of unconventional graphic techniques in addition to standard regional and thematic maps, charts, and photographs. This publication is designed as an introduction and general reference aid for those interested in the People's Republic of China. To make so much information about such a complex and little-known country as meaningful as possible, a great deal of it is placed in a familiar context—that is, by drawing comparisons between China and the United States. 1971. 82 p. il.

\$5.25

Place your order now for copies to be mailed about the latter part of May 1972.

30 APRIL 1972

STATINTL

PARADE'S SPECIAL

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

BECAUSE OF VOLUME OF MAIL RECEIVED, PARADE REGRETS IT CANNOT ANSWER QUERIES ABOUT THIS COLUMN.

HOW NIXON KEEPS INFORMED

The President gets his news in a daily, breezy, highly concentrated digest. Any inference that the President is poorly informed, however, would be unfair.

He spends hours every day poring over government intelligence reports. Each morning, for instance, he receives a bound book with the legend on the cover: "Intelligence Checklist for the President. Top Secret." It is the CIA's morning summation of the world's events, with punchy headlines on the left-hand page and capsulized information on the right. There is also a section of commentary. Dissents by top officials from the conclusions of CIA's majority appear as footnotes.

A similar book, called the "Daily Digest," contains often parallel information from the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency. Still another, in a grim black cover, is produced by another arm of the Pentagon, the National Security Agency. It is a distillation of electronic communications gathered by agents around the world and by satellites and other long-range listening devices.

NSA employs thousands of technicians in its sprawling headquarters at Fort Meade, Md.--halfway between Washington and Baltimore--to crack the codes of foreign powers and translate their monitored voice communications into interpretable information.


The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which also produces daily intelligence summaries, adds its assessments.

All vie for the President's attention and approval. It isn't simply a matter of keeping him informed. All the agencies involved are painfully aware that the document delivered to the President is a sales brochure as well as a news briefing.

Our foreign intelligence, in total, costs the U.S. more than \$1 million a day. To keep the money coming, the intelligence reports are unconscionably lavish.

At the White House, the State Department's information usually gets short shrift. The Defense Intelligence Agency's report is carefully studied, particularly for information on Indochina. The aural voyeurism of NSA occasionally produces startling developments. But the most literate, most titillating, more carefully read reports come from the CIA. In times of crisis, all these agencies keep the White House in constant touch with every twitch their agents spot. Even when the world seems calm, there is a steady flow. And wherever the President goes to sleep--in Washington, San Clemente, Key Biscayne or Camp David--another report from the CIA is waiting to be read before the lights go off.

THE SELLING OF



Text by Morton Kondracke
Photography by Dennis Brack & Fred Ward

U.S. Force on Taiwan Is Said to Number 8,000

By RICHARD HALLORAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 27 — American forces on Taiwan, reported to number 8,000 to 9,000, are there to help defend the Chinese Nationalist refuge and they also support American troops in Vietnam.

About half the men are stationed at the Ching Chuan Kang air base in the center of the island near the provincial capital of Taichung, where there are sizable repair facilities. Transports often stop there on the way to Vietnam from Okinawa.

American defense responsibilities under a 1954 treaty are exercised by the Taiwan Defense Command, headed by Vice Adm. Walter Baumberger. The command has only a few hundred men but could be enlarged if hostilities broke out.

Air Force Headquarters

The 13th Air Force has a forward headquarters on Taiwan that is a detachment from its main headquarters at Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines. It too has a small number of men and only a few Phantom jet fighters.


There have been reports that the United States has deployed nuclear weapons on Taiwan but they have been denied by authoritative sources here and in Asia.

The American military advisory group on Taiwan numbers about 300 men. They help train the Nationalist forces and supervise their supply of American military equipment and weapons.

A contingent of about 1,000 men maintains equipment, runs post exchanges and performs administrative functions.

The Central Intelligence Agency and Air America, a private airline whose only customer is the C.I.A., have installations on Taiwan. United States Government agencies also have extensive radio facilities to transmit to mainland China and to monitor broadcasts.

As President Nixon has reduced the number of American troops in Vietnam, American bases on Taiwan have become less necessary to support that



The New York Times/Feb. 23, 1972

operation. That presumably will continue to be true as the United States withdraws from Vietnam but the bases may have some use in logistic support of South Vietnamese forces.

History of Defense

When the Chinese Communists came to power on the mainland in 1949, President Truman said that the United States would not become involved in any conflict over the island, to which Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his followers had fled.

But when the Chinese Communists entered the Korean war toward the end of 1950, Mr. Truman affirmed American support for the nationalists and began military assistance to Taiwan. President Eisenhower increased military aid.

The 1954 mutual defense treaty defined Nationalist Chinese territory as Taiwan and the Pescadore Islands in the Formosa Strait. American territory to be defended in any attack was defined as "the island territories in the West Pacific under its jurisdiction."

In 1955, the Senate adopted the Formosa Resolution, which was intended to give the President a free hand in committing American forces to the defense of Taiwan. An effort in the Senate last year to repeal the resolution failed.

The Seventh Fleet, which had gradually reduced its forces in the Formosa Strait, ceased patrolling that area about two years ago.

Newsmen Bone Up for 'China Exam'

Washington Post Foreign Service

HONOLULU, Feb. 18 — Most press airplanes accompanying the President on his trips look like holiday excursions, with newsmen drinking, playing cards or joking with the stewardesses. But the reporters currently going with Mr. Nixon to Peking strangely resemble a classroom of China students cramming for their final exams.

Instead of trading old anecdotes about previous presidential voyages, as reporters usually do on such journeys, the journalists on this flight are talking about such esoteric subjects as Mao Tse-Tung's relations with Chou En-Lai, Sino-Japanese trade and the composition of the Chekiang Province Communist Party committee, whose leaders the President will meet when he visits the resort city of Hangchow.

The newsmen on this trip are also voraciously reading books and articles on China. The most popular book on the aircraft, a Pan American Boeing-707 converted to contain only first-class seats, is "the United States and China" by Prof. John Fairbank, head of Harvard's East Asia Research Center and dean of American China scholars.

Another reading matter being absorbed include the recent articles in the Atlantic Monthly by Rose Terrill, also a Harvard China scholar, who spent 40 days traveling around China last summer.

In addition to these obvious works, more exotic books are being studied by a few ambitious newsmen. John Chancellor of the National Broadcasting Company, for example, is buried in the "I Ching," the classic Chinese book of changes, searching for parallels be-

tween ancient and contemporary China.

A select number of reporters are also armed with a new atlas of China prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency. A pool of newsmen aboard the President's airplane, the Spirit of '76, asked Mr. Nixon if he thought the Chinese would tolerate such material in their country.

The President, who apparently had not seen the atlas before, examined it, then laughed loudly and quipped: "This will probably show how much we don't know about China."

The main collection of research matter provided reporters by the administration is a handsome, loose-leaf volume containing information about China ranging from its literacy rate and Gross National Product to the line-up of its leaders.

The roster of leaders has been carefully brought up to date, since it does not include Defense Minister Lin Piao and 10 other full and alternate members of the ruling politburo who have been purged. This also suggests that the administration officially considers them to have been eliminated—though the subject of domestic Chinese politics is rarely mentioned by White House spokesmen.

The research material provided by the administration also offers some political details. Among other things, it says that high-heel shoes "are extremely dangerous" at the Great Wall, which the President and Mrs. Nixon will visit.

Most of the newsmen en route to Peking candidly concede to their ignorance about China. But a handful on the press airplane can claim to varying degrees of expertise or at least familiarity with China.

Aboard the aircraft, for instance, is Theodore H.

White, who was a correspondent for Time Magazine in China during World War II and afterward wrote the bestselling "Thunder Out of China." Henry Hartzenbusch of the Associated Press was born in Shanghai and lived there for years, and the Wall Street Journal's Robert L. Keatley spent a month in China in May.

The language capability of the reporters is virtually zero, however. To improve this gap somewhat, newsmen have been issued manuals featuring such phrases as "Wo Yau Yi Tau Mao Jrfu," or "I would like a Mao suit."

The manual also advises reporters how to order bacon and eggs in Mandarin Chinese. But it does not contain the phrase "Long Live President Nixon."

STATINTL

Briefly Peking . . .

The President brought along an atlas of China prepared by the CIA. On the plane he wondered whether he would be allowed into a communist country with a book bearing the CIA legend. ✓

Drugs Used as Well

STATINTL

Will American-Made Computers Help Soviets Put Down Dissent?

By PAUL SCOTT

The proposed sale of large, modern American computers to the Soviet Union has raised an explosive moral issue in addition to a security one for the Nixon Administration.

The moral question, now being sharply debated at the highest levels of the government, involves whether the U.S. should provide the Kremlin computers that can be used to tighten government control over the lives of Soviet citizens and to help suppress the growing political dissent in that country.

In an article being carefully studied at the White House, the distinguished expert on Soviet affairs, Victor Zorza, described the growth of the massive computerized information system in Russia and the way Soviet planners intend to use it as a weapon of thought control. Zorza wrote:

"...The main purpose of such system would be to prevent any disloyal ideas from even taking shape in the heads of Soviet citizens.... The full records of his psychological characteristics and actions could be used to devise an approach that would quickly persuade him... that his best interests require him to conform to the political guidance of his spiritual adviser at the KGB [the Soviet secret police.]"

The Zorza report, along with other information gathered by the Central Intelligence Agency, clearly shows how the power of a computerized information system, coupled with mood creating or altering biochemical discoveries, provide a new tool for suppressing dissent in Russia.

One of the CIA's documents is a 200-page account of Soviet perversion of psychiatry and computers into weapons of political repression. The account was smuggled out of Russia by friends of some of the KGB victims.

It stresses how the new technology, symbolized by computer power, is becoming the operative arm of the Soviet government's program of locking political dissenters in mental institutions.

A conclave of the Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church outside of Russia, in Frankfurt, Germany, issued a little-noticed but moving "Declaration to Christians."

about the new method of destroying dissent in Russia. In their opening paragraph, the Bishops warned:

"Terrible news has reached us from Russia. Religious people, and those citizens vindicating their right to think otherwise than in terms of party directions, have been whisked away to so-called 'Special Psychiatric Hospitals.' Subjected to drugs, they are numbed and can no longer defend their faith."

The Declaration of Frankfurt never caused much of a stir in U.S. official circles until recently when a Soviet defector revealed that the Russians were using Western-made computers to gather information on all dissenters as part of their new drive to destroy all internal political dissent.

Soviet computer specialist Alexander Lerner, dinner host recently to Rep. James H. Scheuer (D-N.Y.), who was expelled for the meeting, confirmed the use of computers by the government there to smash dissent.

Rather than be a party to the Kremlin's effort to control the minds of Russian citizens, Lerner risked being sent to a mental institution himself by signing an open letter with eight colleagues appealing for support to leave the country.

Lerner in his talk with Americans furnished details of the 'Special Psychiatric Hospitals,' collaborating with the KGB and their use of computers, in Moscow, Leningrad, Kaluga, Minsk and other cities.

With the Russians seeking to purchase upward of 15,000 computers in the U.S. and Western Europe over the next five years, Soviet defectors have warned that many of these will be put to work controlling and suppressing dissent within the Soviet Union.

The American-made computers, they report, also are being sought for use in the Soviet's space and weapons programs which could greatly endanger this country's security and lead in several strategic fields.

The importance that the Soviets give to computers and their operations is indicated by the swift reaction of the KGB to Lerner's meeting with Rep. Scheuer. Scheuer on the spot. In their questioning

of Scheuer, KGB officials appeared a lot more interested in what information, if any, Lerner might have passed on about what Soviet computers are being used for than anything else.

The incident and the raising of the moral issue have given Defense Department officials, who have been opposing the sale of American computers to the Soviets on security grounds, new hope that the State and Commerce departments might withdraw their support for sales to the Russians.

Instead of supporting computer sales to Russia, the Defense Department officials argue that the State Department should be going all-out to support an international move to condemn the Russians' perversion of computers and psychiatry into tools of political repression.

The Canadian Psychiatric Association, on the initiative of Dr. Norman B. Hirt, of Vancouver, has called on all medical and psychiatric societies—including the World Health Organization of the United Nations—to denounce the Soviet's new form of tyranny.

The move has been getting good support from most Western governments except the United States. Dr. Henry Kissinger, the President's chief foreign policy-maker, reportedly has blocked support on the grounds "such action might jeopardize relations with the Soviet Union." The President must now decide whether this policy will be applied to computer sales.

THE AFRICA DOSS

As British influence in Africa declined, so did British secret service, sending hundreds of agents to African capitals like Accra, Lagos, to buttress "sensitive" states against communism and protect.

E. H. Cookridge continues his exclusive series on the CIA.

THE adventurous operations often bordering on the bizarre which the Central Intelligence Agency pursued in many parts of the world are usually ascribed to one man: Allen Dulles. They culminated in the abortive invasion of Cuba in 1961. When Dulles departed from the directorship of CIA after the Bay of Pigs debacle, he certainly left an indelible stamp of his influence as the architect of the mighty CIA edifice and its worldwide ramifications.


The policy of his successors has, however, been no less forceful. CIA activities under its present director, Richard McGarrah Helms, may appear less aggressive because they are being conducted with greater caution and less publicity, and because they have been adroitly adjusted to the changing climate in international politics. In the past CIA gained notoriety by promoting revolutions in Latin American banana republics, and supporting anti-communist regimes in South-East Asia. Its operations in Africa were more skilfully camouflaged. For many years they had been on a limited scale because the CIA had relied on the British secret service to provide intelligence from an area where the British had unsurpassed experience and long-established sources of information. But with the emergence of the many African independent countries, the wave of "anti-colonialist" emotions, and the growing infiltration of Africa by Soviet and Chinese "advisers", British influence declined. Washington forcefully stepped, through CIA, into the breach, with the avowed aim of containing communist expansion.

Financial investments in new industrial and mining enterprises, and lavish economic aid to the emerging governments of the "underdeveloped" countries, paved the road for the influx of hundreds of CIA agents. Some combined their intelligence assignments with genuine jobs as technical, agricultural and scientific advisers.

The British Government - particularly after the Labour Party had come to power in 1964 - withdrew most of their SIS and MI5 officials from African capitals, though some remained, at the request of many rulers, to organise their own new intelligence and security services. CIA



A bloodless coup in Uganda in January last year installed Major-General Idi Amin as military ruler (above: a section of his troops). How far was the CIA in the coup? A pro-rebel poster attacks American intervention in Santo Domingo.



men began hurriedly to establish their "stations" in Accra, Lagos, Nairobi, Kampala, Dar-es-Salaam, Lusaka, the "sensitive areas" in danger of slipping under communist sway.

By the mid-1960s several senior CIA officials, such as Thomas J. Gunning and Edward Foy, both former U.S. Army Intelligence officers, were firmly established at Accra. They were later joined by William B. Edmondson, who had served in the British secret service in East Africa, and Mrs Stella Davis, an attractive, motherly woman, whom no one would have suspected of hav-

ing served for many years as a skilful FBI agent before joining CIA and being employed at Addis Ababa, Nairobi, and Dar-es-Salaam, acquiring fluency in Swahili. By 1965 the Accra CIA Station had two-score active operators, distributing largesse among President Nkrumah's secret adversaries.

The Americans had every intention of helping Ghana's economy by building the Volta Dam, thus providing hydro-electric power for the

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NEWS & OBSERVER

M - 130,652
S - 148,247

IDEC 6 1971

Lab Develops Simplified Computer Program

DURHAM — It's faster than a speeding pencil, more powerful than a platoon of file clerks, and able to hurdle vast quantities of data in a single leap.

But it's not a bird, a plane or Superman. It's a computer program developed by the National Laboratory for Higher Education (NLHE) in Durham, formerly the Regional Education Laboratory for the Carolinas and Virginia, an independent, nonprofit organization established in 1966.

Like Superman, the NLHE Information System is tackling a lot of problems. It's helping conservation officials chart pollution in the Great Lakes, guiding lonely hearts in New York City to their soulmates, aiding the CBS Election News Unit prepare voter profiles, and helping the CIA do whatever it is the CIA does.

Actually, the system was designed to meet needs much more mundane. About 250 colleges and universities have small-scale computers, but have been unable to make maximum use of them because there was no system that could easily classify and retrieve information in a form useful to administrators.

So NLHE, together with two colleges, developed a computer program to meet this need — a program that administrators can use without having a computer specialist write a special set of instructions for the computer.

In March, the two institutions that helped NLHE develop the system — Furman University, Greenville, S. C., and Clarke College, Dubuque, Iowa — declared it ready for an extensive trial.

Furman used the system to generate more than 25 different reports for its admissions office, and saved an estimated 800 man-hours of programming time in the process. Clarke used the system to handle class registration and other student records, producing more than 100 reports and saving an estimated 400 hours of programming time.

The laboratory then offered the system to the 250 colleges with small-scale computers. The system consists of two manuals and a deck of computer cards, and was made available for \$25, the cost of producing and mailing the materials.

Diverse Users

Within eight months, more than 160 of the 250 potential college users had acquired the system. More surprisingly, about 137 schools, other nonprofit organizations, government agencies, and commercial firms have acquired the system.

Peter Haack of the Great Lakes Fisheries Laboratory, U.S. Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, Ann Arbor, Mich., is using the system to keep track of DDT, Dieldrin, mercury, and other poisons in the Great Lakes.

The system helps Haack keep abreast of the effects


of water depth; temperature; location of fish, their age and species; and the level of poisons present.

Icebreaker, Inc., the New York City is a computer dating firm. It uses the system to match clients and to give Cupid a technological shove. Age, hobbies, education, location, and personal preferences are fed into the computer, and the system helps match star-crossed or data-entwined lovers.

The CBS Election News Unit is using the system to analyze past election trends, compare them with present opinion polls, and spot likely winners in the 1972 election.

1 DEC 1971

STATINTI



HAVING lived in New York for several decades one summer, I feel qualified to give sage advice of new residents of Baghdad, I mean, Baghdad on the Hudson. I refer, of course, to the Red Chinese U.N. delegates. One of the first things they'll have to learn is that New Yorkers often refer to the city by other names: Manhattan, Gotham, the aforesaid Baghdad on the Hudson use those other names is because if they really called New York what they wanted to, I couldn't print it.

The Chinese may misunderstand certain things, such as garbage collection and street cleaning. As a contribution to antipollution effort, the city fathers are trying to dump as little refuse as possible in city dumps or out at sea. The best way to accomplish this is to not pick up garbage and trash in the streets. Then there's no need to dump it at sea, see? At some point the Chinese may think their phones are tapped, simply because when dialing their quarters from the U.N. Building they may occasionally get the New York office of the CIA. Other times they may get Joe's Pizza Shop. I advise the Chinese not to worry about this. It simply means that N.Y.C.'s telephone lines are a bit confused. (If it's any comfort to them, even the CIA often gets Joe's Pizza Shop.)

Folks laugh at the Reds for buying everything with \$100 bills and waiting politely for change. Well, they won't be silly for very long, because with inflation the way it is and with the prices in New York anyway, pretty soon \$100 will BE change. (Yeah, I know, that's an old joke. But the Chinese don't know that — they just got here, remember?) Oh, and a word about strikes. Whenever there is a strike of some labor force in New York, the Red Chinese should — being Communists and naturally sympathetic to workers — simply not go to work. That way, I figure they can miss about 219 days per year.

Finally, here is some advice about getting along with the natives: To make friends with a New York cab driver, the Chinese should give him helpful hints on the routes and warn him of various traffic regulations. Bus drivers are delighted to help you on and off the buses, but you must ask them: In restaurants, never tip. This is an insult to the working classes. New York policemen love to be called "coppers" and a swell way to make a hit with one just now is to say "Hey, how come you weren't on TV with the others?" (This is in reference to a question-and-answer show New York police had recently.) By following these suggestions, the Reds should really find New York to be Fun City!

HENRY J. TAYLOR

The Man-Machines Are Coming

Subject to NATO and U. S. Government approval, International Business Machines has received a Soviet order for a super giant computer—the largest Russia would have.

Only nine American mini computers are in place there today. This one is IBM's incredible 360-195, capable of handling 16 million programmed instructions per second—yes, per second.



The related think-tanks in our State Department and Defense Department have come up with a joint conviction regarding computers. Both departments and dealing with merely different aspects of essentially the same problem: America's standing in the world. And their joint conviction is that computer power is now an index of national strength comparable to steel production before World War II.

THE COMMON MARKET NATIONS have only about one-fifth the computers of the United States. With Great Britain in the Common Market the nations would have one-third. On a relative basis, Russia is truly now a have-not nation. The U.S.S.R. lags far behind Japan, West Germany, Britain and France, and simply fails to hold a candle to the United States.

Actually, however, the State-Defense think-tanks find that the computer-age advancement areas are mostly ahead of us.

A super giant computer such as IBM may sell Russia makes an error about every 30 minutes. But this is equivalent to one human error every 18 years, so much work does it do before making a mistake. Today's advanced computers can do in a few hours all the arithmetic estimated ever to have been done by hand by everyone in all recorded history.

OUR NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY has the world's most elaborate computer system. Boeing, in turn, has \$100 million worth of computers. Without these, the 747's wing alone would have taken company engineers 20 years of computations.

The newest nuclear reactor designs will require about 100 billion—yes, billion—computations. Computers will soon provide the answers in a matter of days.

Our Central Intelligence Agency now has a converter that turns Russian into English at the rate of 30,000 words an hour. And so it goes.

YOU CAN GET any kind of logical result. But everything a computer can do must be done within the logical sequence you have set up for it. Whatever you program into it is the limit of its thinking. You can compose a sonnet in a computer. You can study the effect of Milton's style on Shelley. You can write music. But it is completely derivative.

However, in a vast, basic leap forward, that hitherto inviolate limitation is being penetrated.

Facing disaster on the moon and down to 500 feet, Neil A. Armstrong took part of the control away from the computerized automatic control system. With his right hand he manipulated the altitude of his vehicle, Eagle, holding it while he could peer out of the window into the fateful bolder-strewn crater below, the size of a football field. With his left hand he began to carry Eagle down with a gentle bump 1,200 feet beyond the crater. Two Americans, blessings be, had landed on the moon. But now enter Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Marvin Minsky in charge of its Project MAC.

DR. MINSKY has convincingly forecast to the State-Defense think-tanks that within eight years we will have a machine with the general intelligence of a human being—able to read Shakespeare, grease an automobile, think for itself. It could travel about the moon for months and without a single beep of directions from the earth—fundamentally different from the Soviet moon-exploring Lunokhod 1, which was earth-controlled.

It could gather rocks, drill cores, originate surveys, think of photographs and even decided to lay planks over crevices it had made up its mind to cross. At the Stanford Research Institute a prototype is already performing with the general intelligence abilities of a four-year-old child.

With this breakthrough, and with the modifications that are ahead, the machine will begin to educate itself at fantastic speeds. It can head straight for the genius level and, literally, its powers seem incalculable.

Several State-Defense think-tankers regard as optimistic a timetable of less than 15 years from now. But they agree that the breakthrough is here, that man-made self-educating "men" who actually think for themselves are indisputably in our future, and that the mentality of the best of these will in certain respects far, far surpass ours.

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000100140001-8



HENRY J. TAYLOR

Our Spy Elephant Is Sick

STATINTL

Behind the scenes President Nixon's confidence in Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard M. Helms has taken a new leap forward. Mr. Nixon believes (correctly) that our nation's intelligence setup is a sick elephant. He has quietly assigned Mr. Helms to correct it.

A sick elephant is a formidable danger. And secrecy keeps our public from knowing even the size of this elephant, to say nothing of how sick it is.

Incredibly, we spend close to \$3 billion a year for intelligence. Just the CIA alone is larger in scope than the State Department and spends more than twice as much money. Legendary Gen. William J. ("Wild Bill") Donovan's Office of Strategic Services conducted our entire World War II espionage throughout four years and throughout the world for a total \$135 million. The budget of the CIA (secret) is at least \$1.5 billion a year.

NEXT TO THE PENTAGON with its 25 miles of corridors, the world's largest office building, the CIA's headquarters in suburban Langley, Va., is the largest building in the Washington area. The CIA has jurisdiction only abroad, not in the United States. But the CIA maintains secret offices in most major U.S. cities, totally unknown to the public.

About 10,000 people work at Langley and another 5,000 are scattered across the world, burrowing everywhere for intelligence. These include many, many unsung heroes who secretly risk their lives for our country in the dark and unknown battles of espionage and treachery. I could name many. And as a part of its veil of secrecy the CIA has its own clandestine communications system with Washington and the world.

The Pentagon spends \$3 billion a year on intelligence, twice as much as the CIA. Like the CIA, its Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence arms operate worldwide, of course, and — largely unknown — they also have an immense adjunct called the National Security Agency which rivals the CIA in size and cost.

Then there exists the important Intelligence Section of the State Department, likewise worldwide. Its chief reports directly to Under Secretary

of State John N. Irwin 2nd, it is understandably very close to its vest.

ADDITIONAL intelligence agencies — all growing, all sprawling, all costly — spread out into the world from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, National Aeronautics & Space Administration (NASA), and even the Department of Commerce.

In fact, there are so many additional hush-hush agencies that recently in West and East Berlin alone there were at least 40 known U.S. intelligence agencies and their branches — most of them competing with one another.

Mr. Helms himself defines intelligence as "all the things which should be known in advance of initiating a course of action." The acquisition of intelligence is one thing; the interpretation of it is another; and the use of it is a third. The 1917 statute creating the CIA limits it to the first two. It also makes the CIA directly responsible to the President. But it is simply not true that the CIA is the over-all responsible agency, as is so widely believed.

Again and again, no one and everyone is responsible.

THE FUNCTION of intelligence is to protect us from surprises. It's not working that way. The sick elephant is threatening our national security by surprise, surprise, surprise.

Alarmed President Nixon has given Mr. Helms new and sweeping intelligence reorganization authority on an over-all basis. He has given him the first authority ever given anyone to review, and thus effect, all our foreign intelligence agencies' budgets. The President believes Mr. Helms, this undercover world's most experienced pro, can cut at least \$1 billion out of the morass.

The President confided that he is totally fed up with the intelligence community's duplications, contradictions, self-protective vagueness and dangerous rivalries. He has made it clear that he wants its output brought closer to the needs of the President's so-called 40 Committee (actually six men), which serves the National Security Council, and the President himself.

In amputating much of the sick elephant, Mr. Helms' directive is to cut down on the surprises. And the President could not have picked a more knowing, no-nonsense man to do it.

QUINCY, MASS.
PATRIOT LEDGER

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OCT 20 1971

CSA Awards

\$61.3 Million

Pact To Honeywell

WALTHAM — Honeywell Information Systems Inc. was awarded a \$61.3 million federal contract last week to supply the Pentagon, Air Force and CIA with computer systems, a company spokesman said yesterday.

The contract, awarded by the federal General Services Administration, calls for nine large scale "Series 6,000" computers with the option to acquire 26 additional computer systems, during fiscal 1972-1973.

The systems will be used for the World Wide Military Command and Control Systems and for government intelligence, the spokesman said.

The contract will not mean any additional personnel for the Waltham plant, but expansion is planned in the Oklahoma City and the Phoenix plants, he said.

The Situation Room

The Nerve Endings in the White House Basement

By Aldo Beckman

Mr. Beckman is a member of The Tribune's Washington Bureau. He is assigned to the White House.

WASHINGTON—More than 1,000 intelligence reports a day pour into a plainly decorated suite of rooms nestled into a corner of the White House basement.

Many are routine but the knowledge that reports of any attack on the United States by a hostile power would reach here first creates a pressure-cooker atmosphere for the young staff that mans the facility 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

There are no holidays in the White House Situation Room, the strategically important focal point upon which the President of the United States must rely for instant information. Modern communications, well-organized dissemination procedures and a dedicated staff are intertwined with a world-wide intelligence network and aimed at a goal of informing the President of events anywhere in the world within minutes after they occur.

Dependent on Other Agencies

David McManus, 34, the quietly confident director of the Situation Room is quick to emphasize that the success of his operation is dependent, in a large measure, to similar intelligence-receiving facilities in the Departments of State and Defense, and in the Central Intelligence Agency.

"We live off the fruits of other agencies," he said during an interview in the paneled conference room, where the indirect lighting, the cork wall designed for easy stamping of world maps, and the impressive-looking rectangular conference table leave a visitor with the feeling that the room could be used as a movie prop for a White House war room.

McManus, in an obvious effort to stifle interagency rivalries that once were rampant in the United States intelligence community, estimated that 97 per cent of the reports reaching the Situation Room, which occupies the 12 dozen rooms—are relayed thru other

agencies. Diplomatic cables go first to the Department of State, intelligence reports are routed to the Central Intelligence Agency, and military up-dates are moved to the Pentagon.

However, intelligence outposts, whether they are radar stations in the frozen Arctic keeping an eye on flight patterns of Soviet bombers over the North Pole, or intelligence vessels trailing a Soviet submarine off the North Carolina coast, have the capability to flash information directly to the White House.

Dozen Teletype Machines

The overthrow of a head of state, unusual bomber deployments by a potentially hostile power, or the sighting of missiles heading toward the United States would be flashed directly to the White House Situation Room.

The reports move into the White House on one of a dozen teletype machines in the bomb shelter under the East Wing and are dispatched immediately to the Situation Room, in the West Wing, via a pneumatic tube, arriving there 34 seconds later.

One of the two or three duty officers on duty receives the report and has the authority to instantly and personally contact the President, regardless of the time of day or night, if he believes the report is of such importance. The capability for instant Presidential contact is maintained by the Army Signal Corps and is there whether the President is sleeping in the White House residence, working in his Oval Office, on board Air Force 1 over the Pacific, or riding in a motorcade thru downtown Belgrade.

"If the missiles are coming our way, the President has to know it," McManus explained.

Those same duty officers also have the authority to immediately contact Henry Kissinger, Nixon's assistant for national security affairs, or McManus, if a report arrives that requires some quick attention.

Kissinger Occasionally Called

Kissinger is occasionally called, and McManus receives several calls a week on the White House phone next to his bed.

He and James Fazio, 33, deputy director of the Situation Room, take turns being "on call." Whoever is on call never goes to bed without telephoning the duty officer for an update on reports and, when not in bed, is never without a "page boy," an electronic device the size of a tiny transistor radio whose buzz can be activated in the Situation Room, signalling its carrier to immediately telephone his office.

The two young intelligence analysts also take turns coming into the office shortly after dawn to put the finishing touches on the President's daily intelligence briefing.

The three or four page report, carrying 10 to 12 single or double paragraph items, represents the highlights of reports received during the previous 24 hours. Kissinger wants it by 8 a. m. and sometimes asks that items be reworded to more accurately reflect his feeling on a subject.

"It's our daily newspaper," said McManus, "but we don't try to be comprehensive." An effort is made, however, to focus on what currently is under discussion in the National Security Council.

The daily briefing, which Kissinger carries in to the President, is not intended to serve as a working paper, but is designed to present, in capsule form for the chief executive, the latest developments thruout the world.

Daily status reports on the action in South Viet Nam are included. Several weeks ago, Nixon learned the results of a bombing raid he had ordered to wipe out a fuel dump near the demilitarized zone in North Viet Nam, when he read the report from the Situation Room.

Nixon has spent little time in the room since his inauguration, in marked contrast to his predecessor.

"President Johnson was here a lot," recalled McManus, who served as lia-

THE CIA--An Attack and a Reply
STATINTL

A FORMER STAFF OFFICER CRITICIZES CIA ACTIVITIES

STATINTL

Is the CIA starting to spy on Americans at home--turning talents and money against students, blacks, others? That is one of several key questions raised in a wide ranging criticism. A direct response starts on page 81. STATINTL

THE ATTACK

The following was written by Edward K. DeLong of United Press International, based on an interview with a Central Intelligence Agency official who has resigned. The dispatch was distributed by UPI for publication on October 3.

Victor Marchetti embarked 16 years ago on a career that was all any aspiring young spy could ask. But two years ago, after reaching the highest levels of the Central Intelligence Agency, he became disenchanted with what he perceived to be amorality, overwhelming military influence, waste and duplicity in the spy business. He quit.

Fearing today that the CIA may already have begun "going against the enemy within" the United States as they may conceive it--that is, dissident student groups and civil-rights organizations--Marchetti has launched a campaign for more presidential and congressional control over the entire U. S. intelligence community.

"I think we need to do this because we're getting into an awfully dangerous era when we have all this talent (for clandestine operations) in the CIA--and more being developed in the military, which is getting into clandestine "ops" (operations)--and there just aren't that many places any more to display that talent," Marchetti says.

"The cold war is fading. So is the war in Southeast Asia, except for Laos. At the same time, we're getting a lot of domestic problems. And there are people in the CIA who--if they aren't right now actually already running domestic operations against student groups, black movements and the like--are certainly considering it.

"This is going to get to be very tempting," Marchetti said in a recent interview at his comfortable home in Oakton, [Va.], a Washington suburb where many CIA men live.

"There'll be a great temptation for these people to suggest operations and for a President to approve them or to kind of look the other way. You have the danger of intelligence turning against the nation itself, going against the 'the enemy within.'"

Marchetti speaks of the CIA from an insider's point of view. At Pennsylvania State University he deliberately prepared himself for an intelligence career, graduating in 1955 with a degree in Russian studies and history.

Through a professor secretly on the CIA payroll as a talent scout, Marchetti netted the prize all would-be spies dream of--an immediate job offer from the CIA. The offer came during a secret meeting in a hotel room, set up by a stranger who telephoned and identified himself only as "a friend of your brother."

Marchetti spent one year as a CIA agent in the field and 10 more as an analyst of intelligence relating to the Soviet Union, rising through the ranks until he was helping prepare the national intelligence estimates for the White House. During this period, Marchetti says, "I was a hawk. I believed in what we were doing."

Then he was promoted to the executive staff of the CIA, moving to an office on the top floor of the Agency's headquarters across the Potomac River from Washington.

For three years he worked as special assistant to the CIA chief of plans, programs and budgeting, as special assistant to the CIA's executive director, and as executive assistant to the Agency's deputy director, V. Adm. Rufus L. Taylor.

"This put me in a very rare position within the Agency and within the intelligence community in general, in that I was in a place where it was being all pulled together," Marchetti said.

"I could see how intelligence analysis was done and how it fitted into the scheme of clandestine operations. It also gave me an opportunity to get a good view of the intelligence community, too: the National Security Agency, the DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency), the national reconnaissance organization--the whole bit. And I started to see the politics within the community and the politics between the community and the outside. This change of perspective during those three years had a profound effect on me, because I began to see things I didn't like."

With many of his lifelong views about the world shattered, Marchetti decided to abandon his chosen career. One of the reasons, he says, was the attitude of the CIA's Director, Richard Helms, why he was leaving.



Mr. Marchetti

PORTLAND, ORE.
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 OREGONIAN

SEP 26 1971

M - 245,132

S - 407,186

Vietnam protests against Americans turn more violent

By KEYES BEECHE

Chicago Daily News Service

SAIGON -- Political unrest in this uneasy capital took a violent anti-American turn Saturday, but threatened mass demonstrations against President Nguyen Van Thieu's Oct. 3 one-man presidential election failed to materialize.

One American GI was wounded by gunfire, four American sailors were beaten up and four American vehicles were fire bombed by roving bands of South Vietnamese student radicals.

The GI was shot in the arm late Friday night as he was walking from the U.S. Army's 3rd Field Hospital near Tan Son Nhut Airbase to his barracks. His companion, another GI who was unhurt, said two shots were fired as four young Vietnamese sped by on two Hondas.

The four got away and there was nothing to indicate they were students.

A U.S. Navy chief petty officer died a few days earlier after he was evacuated to Japan for treatment of burns suffered when he was trapped in a parked pickup truck, which was fire bombed in front of U.S. Navy headquarters.

Sailors struck

The four sailors were attacked at the same spot when their van was fire bombed by students at noon Saturday.

As the sailors scrambled out of their burning vehicle, they were attacked by students wielding stones and batons. The sailors fled.

One sailor required several stitches for injuries suffered when his head bounced against the windshield as the driver braked sharply to a stop when the van was hit by the fire bomb. Another sailor was treated for minor injuries after being knocked to the ground.

Up to now, the students apparently intended no physical harm to the Americans, being satisfied to set fire to empty parked cars.

The new outbreak of violence sharply underscored the U.S. military command's growing concern over increased anti-American incidents. Earlier in Da Nang, in central Vietnam, a GI driver fled for his life as a Vietnamese mob gleefully burned his jeep.

"The question is how much longer we can keep our men under control in the face of such provocations," said a U.S. senior officer. "So far, our boys have for the most part kept their cool, but they just don't think it's fair that the people they are here to help should attack them."

The students apparently switched tactics to hit-and-run attacks on American vehicles after their threatened all-out drive to block the Oct. 3 election failed to get off the ground.

4 vehicles burnt

The liveliest action took place on Le Van Duyet Street, near the Cambodian embassy, where three American cars and a South Vietnamese police Jeep were burned within a couple of hours.

One of the vehicles was a blue Ford station wagon identified as belonging to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. The two occupants, one in uniform and the other in civilian clothes, fled when the car caught fire.

But they returned a few minutes later, the civilian carrying a .45 caliber pistol and the uniformed man an M16 rifle, to recover some papers they had left on the front seat.

Minors wounded

Acting with what most observers felt was commendable restraint, Vietnamese combat police drove off the students with tear gas grenades while Saigon police kept traffic moving.

At one point, a police officer fired several shots into the air to drive away the crowd and student radicals mingling with the curious.

No one was injured during this action.

But U.S. Army explosive experts arriving on the scene asked to borrow gas masks from newsmen before venturing into a cloud of tear gas.

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Available



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

2475 E. 17th St. W.

Winnipeg, M.B. R3S 0V8

TOP SECRET

Oct. 23, 1971

...action be taken to temporarily break contact
...the Canadian government's plan to set
...consequences

...and approved.

Shown is photostat of a photograph left at The Montreal Star Washington Bureau, which forwarded it by air to Montreal. The bottom portion (not shown) contained only a repeat of the "top secret" stamp and the initials R. D. above the letters "RD/p" at the bottom of sheet.

WAR OF WORDS

The House in the Alley: CIA 'Ears' in Asia

BY JACK FOISIE
Times Staff Writer

BANGKOK—In a strange house in an alley off Soi 39 (39th St.) here, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency produces documents that quite often end up in the hands of fishmongers as wrapping paper.

The house, with faded green walls, red-tiled roof and surrounded by a corrugated tin fence of forbidding height, is conspicuous by its shabbiness in an otherwise reasonably manicured neighborhood.

It is also conspicuous by the abnormal number of antennas it sprouts.

It is the regional office of an American government agency blandly identified as the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, or FBIS.

Under its roof, approximately 20 American-employed foreign nationals monitor the outpouring of enemy and friendly news and propaganda broadcasts originating in eight Southeast Asia nations.

Supervised by a handful of Americans, the spew of words is recorded and translated into English. The process turns the clutter of 14 languages and dialects gathered from the air waves into a digestible product to be read by FBIS clients.

Detecting Political Trends

The clients are mostly Americans—Asian political specialists and military men assigned to intelligence duties. They read the FBIS reports to detect trends, alterations in political positions, and the rise and fall of leaders in Asian countries.

For the monitors, working around the clock in three shifts, listening to the diatribes or oily persuasion broadcasts can be deadeningly dull. Much of the propaganda is repetitious in theme, and is meant to be.

But there can also be moments of exhilaration for even the most jaded monitor. Recently, a "Prince Sihanouk" broadcast came on the air, but the FBIS specialist immediately that the voice was fake.

The deposed Cambodian monarch, now living in Peking, has been a standout performer in propaganda work for the Chinese Communists. Had he died? Had the Chinese cut him off the air?

Intercepted Own Broadcast

It was later learned—much to the embarrassment of FBIS Americans—that the bogus Sihanouk voice had really come from an American-financed Cambodian government station.

With such goings-on, it seems surprising that the daily FBIS summary of "significant" broadcasts is not a secret document. But it is one of the few products of the CIA, of which FBIS is a part, that is not stamped secret.

"We are the straight-forward outfit in the agency," an FBIS employee explained.

While other CIA sections monitor certain types of coded enemy—and sometimes friendly—radio traffic, FBIS eavesdrops on programs that peasants are hearing over a communal radio, and soldiers in barracks or in bivouac are listening to on transistorized sets. That explains why the monitoring is not considered a classified project.

Not that the bulky stapled sheaf of blue-ink summaries is available to just anyone. But copies of the daily

report can be begged, borrowed or purloined. In Vientiane, the Lao capital where both sides in the Indochina war have diplomats, FBIS is "must" reading in every embassy.

Eventually the discarded FBIS copies end up in the market place, where peddlers use them to wrap fish.

The FBIS distillation of Southeast Asia's war of words is probably most eagerly read by military briefers, who must put pins on maps and inform their generals of daily combat action. While enemy radio broadcasts describing "great victories" are read with a jaundiced eye, their exaggerations are sometimes no greater, one officer admitted, than what the friendly governments of Laos, Cambodia and Thailand are reporting about the same actions.

"By having both versions, we're in a position to judge what really happened," he explained.

First Reports

In times of turmoil, weakly powered clandestine stations often give the first reports as to whether a government has fallen, or a secessionist movement is still viable. The East Pakistan "Bengla Desh" movement was more active on radio than in battle the first few months.

The FBIS station on Okinawa, which devotes its main effort to monitoring the radios on the Chinese mainland, has the added responsibility of "cruising." Patient operators "twirl the dial" on all possible wave bands and frequencies to detect new radio stations, be they but a gasoline-powered "one-lung" transmitter set in the jungle.

Diplomatic feelers are sometimes first voiced, or replied to, on clandestine radios. For a year, the allied-backed Lao premier, Prince Souvanna Phouma, and his half-brother Prince Souphanouvong, leader of the Communist Pathet Lao, have been making peace proposals. Souphanouvong, often as not, has been voicing his ploys through a pair of Lum-and-Abner "uncles," Hak and Sat, who hold a 30-minute conversation over clandestine Radio Pathet Lao every Sunday morning.

Folksy Chat

A folksy chat, or a slightly risqué sing-song exchange, is standard entertainment in Laos. To assure an audience, the Pathet Lao make most of their propaganda points to the people in these forms.

Uncle Hak and Uncle Sat discussed Souvanna Phouma's latest peace offer in a broadcast recently. Recorded and translated by FBIS, the Mutt-and-Jeff dialog included this portion:

Hak: Prince Souvanna Phouma's letter to Prince Souphanouvong this time is not different from the previous ones. That is, it avoids coming to grips

STATINTL

15 Sept 1971



HENRY J. TAYLOR

Big Brother Is Growing

If you wonder what has happened to our citizens' privacy, listen to a summary I have just completed. Incredible? One would have thought so. Impossible? One would have hoped so. Unfortunately, it is the squalid truth. Here are the ugly facts:

More than 2,600 computers are now working away — clank, clank, clank — in Washington. They have a full-time potential of supplying a stack of records 2,000 miles high every year. About 250,000 — yes, 250,000 — government employees are chiefly involved with filing the paper into cabinets. These cabinets cover 25 million cubic feet of floor space. That's more than 12 times the entire rentable floor space in the vast 102-story Empire State Building — only for the filing cabinets. The executive branch alone has two million.

Yet the government is now installing additional data-processing computers at the astounding rate of 500 a year — with an emphasis on piling up information about our citizens.

"PRIVACY," SAID late, great Prof. Clinton Rossiter, "is an unbreakable wall of dignity against the entire world." But start with your income tax declaration — probably the most private, intimately revealing thing demanded of citizens. Nearly 80 million of us taxpaying peasants filed these with the Internal Revenue Service this year. The declarations started out to be inviolate. Today, largely unknown to the 80 million, that essential privacy is a mere charade.

Twenty-three federal agencies now have direct access to our citizens' income tax returns for an official total of 100 reasons.

Do not hold the IRS responsible for this. It has fought intrusions tooth and nail. But outside agencies have contrived their intrusions to the IRS's utter dismay.

WITH THE 100 REASONS available to the 23 agencies, what an outrageous opening for scattered bureaucratic insiders. And what an opportunity for crooks, pressure boys, spite artists in your neighborhood, political opponents of men in public life, business rivals and others who can quickly get your declaration by cozy relationships, bribery and other means.

The last census, which is still in the data-processing computers, was not a count of our population, as the Constitution demands. It was, instead, a systematic penetration of our privacy,

undoubtedly useful but expanded nevertheless in accord with the over-all invasion — this worm in the American apple.

The Civil Service Commission, on inquiry, replies that, yes, it now does compile "lead information relating to possible questions" that might come up about countless people. So does the Post Office Department. So does the Department of the Interior. Ridiculously, even the elephantine Interstate Commerce Commission, to our country's shame, gets into this intrusion on such a scale that maybe the ICC should give up its true function entirely and just go into the business of building libraries for itself.

THE PENTAGON ADMITS it has dossiers on 20 million Americans outside the armed forces. Its data bank also keeps files on 7,500 organizations, if you can conceive of that many. In fact, the Pentagon admits that it processes an average 1,200 requests a day for undisclosed information.

The Justice Department lists 13,200 names of persons known to have urged violence. And there are, of course, the vital files of its investigative agency, the FBI.

The Secret Service has compiled on its own a colossal file of what it tells me are "persons of interest." These include those whose only bid for Secret Service attention is their criticism of government policies.

THE Central Intelligence Agency's personal information files are top secret — and tremendous. The CIA has jurisdiction only abroad, not in the United States. Nevertheless, the CIA maintains secret offices in a score of U. S. cities totally unknown to our public.

Big Brother's intrusion into our American life is not new, nor is its incredible undercover, unrevealed expansion schemed and planned in the sense of a sinister design. Actually, it's a drift, like a spreading cancer is a drift. And, behind the scenes today's electronic technological advances are spreading the drift on a scale that should frighten our public out of its boots.

These advances allow Big Brother to acquire, store and use tremendous files of information Big Brother collects on us with a correlation and speed which completely changes the potential for the invasion of privacy. And how long can this hidden prostitution of our intended government continue without wrecking every democratic concept in our democratic system?

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

By Jack Anderson

Intelligence Items

The coded intelligence reports that flood into Washington from all over the world often contain raw, unverified information. The Central Intelligence Agency has devised a simple system for rating the reliability of its reports. The veracity of the source is given an alphabetical rating; an appraisal of the content is rated by number. Thus, an A-1 report would be considered 100 per cent accurate. But if a wholly reliable source passed on a hot barroom rumor, it might be rated A-12. Or if a less trustworthy source submitted what he claimed was a really reliable item, the rating might be C-3. Hereafter, we will use this rating system to help our readers evaluate the accuracy of intelligence items.

Emperor's Surprise (A-2)—No one was more surprised than Emperor Hirohito to learn that his European trip would be interrupted by a stopover in Alaska. Prime Minister Sato neglected to consult the Emperor before setting up the trip. By staging a dramatic meeting between Emperor Hirohito and President Nixon, Sato hopes to take some of the steam out of the hot Japanese reaction to Mr. Nixon's Peking ploy and economic moves against Japan. The Emperor, left out of the backroom planning, was astonished to learn that he would interrupt his European trip to confer with Mr. Nixon in Alaska.

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NO. 19 1971

September

A CIA Paper

"...Although this entire series of discussions was "off the record", the subject of discussion for this particular meeting was especially sensitive and subject to the previously announced restrictions."

—C. Douglas Dillon

By The Africa Research Group

The Central Intelligence Agency is one of the few governmental agencies whose public image has actually improved as a result of the publication of the Pentagon Papers. Despite disclosures of "The Agency's" role in assassinations, sabotage, and coup d'etat's consciously intended to subvert international law, America's secret agency has actually emerged in some quarters with the veneration due prophets, or at least the respect due its suggested efficiency and accuracy.

Virtually every newspaper editor, not to mention Daniel Ellsberg himself, has heaped praise on the CIA for the accuracy of its estimates detailing the U.S. defeat in Vietnam. Time and again, the Agency's "level headed professionalism" has been contrasted with the escalation-overkill orientation of the Pentagon or the President's advisors. The editor of the Christian Science Monitor even called upon policy makers to consult the CIA more, calling it a "remarkably accurate source of information." But such backhanded praise for conspirators confuses public understanding of the important and closely integrated role which the CIA plays in advancing the Pax Americana on a global scale.

For many, the Pentagon Papers provided a first peek into the inner sanctum of foreign policy making. As the government's attempt to suppress the study illustrates, the people are not supposed to have access to the real plans of their government. On close inspection, what emerges is not an "invisible government" but an indivisible system in which each agency offers its own specialized input, and is delegated its own slice of responsibility. Coordinated inter-departmental agencies work out the division of imperial labor. There are disagreements, rivalries, but once the decisions are reached at the top they are carried out with the monolithic tone of state power.

The intelligence community now plays an expanded and critical role in creating and administering the real stuff of American foreign policy. CIA Director Richard Helms presides over a U.S. Intelligence Board which links the secret services of all government agencies, including the FBI. In the White House, Henry Kissinger presides over an expanded National Security Council structure which further centralizes covert foreign policy planning. It is here that the contingency plans are cooked up and the "options" so carefully worked out. It is in these closed chambers and strangelovian "situation rooms" that plans affecting the lives of millions are formulated for subsequent execution by a myriad of U.S. controlled agencies and agents.

Increasingly, these schemes rely on covert tactics whose full meaning is seldom perceived by the people affected — be they Americans or people of foreign countries. The old empires, with their colonial administrators and civilizing mission have given way to the more subtle craftsman of intervention. Their manipulations take place in the front rooms of neo-colonial institutions and the parlors of dependent third world elites. In this world of realpolitik, appearances are often purposely deceptive and political stances intentionally misleading. The U.S. aggression in Vietnam, lest anyone forget, began as a covert involvement largely engineered by the CIA. Similar covert interventions now underway elsewhere in the world may be fueling tomorrow's Vietnams.

It is for this reason that the Africa Research Group, an independent radical research collective, is now making public major excerpts from a document which offers an informed insider's view of the secret workings of the American intelligence apparatus abroad. Never intended for publication, it was made available to the Group which will publish

the complete text of the document will be available for \$1 in late October from Africa Research Group, P.O. Box 213, Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

CIA manipulations.

Richard Bissell, the man who led the Council discussion that night, was well equipped to talk about the CIA. A one-time Yale professor and currently an executive of the United Aircraft Corporation, Bissell served as the CIA's Deputy Director until he "resigned" in the wake of the abortive 1961 invasion of Cuba. The blue-ribbon group to which he spoke included a number of intelligence experts including Robert Amory, Jr., another former Deputy Director, and the late CIA chief, Allen Dulles, long considered the grand old man of American espionage. Their presence was important enough an occasion for international banker Douglas Dillon to

*The complete text of the document will be available for \$1 in late October from Africa Research Group, P.O. Box 213, Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

Continued

BALTIMORE SUN

18 JUL 1977

The CIA looks good in Pentagon papers

By PAUL W. BLACKSTOCK

Ever since the Bay of Pigs fiasco in April, 1961, the Central Intelligence Agency has had a bad press in this country and abroad. The 1957 "revelations" that the agency had secretly financed the National Student Association, plus a number of university-affiliated research institutes and anti-Communist cultural fronts, came as a shock to both students and the public.

Professor Blackstock, a former military-intelligence research analyst and author of several books on the intelligence process, now teaches at the University of South Carolina.

As the United States became bogged down in the Vietnam quagmire and the student anti-war protest gathered momentum, the CIA became a favorite target of abuse. Agency recruiters were driven from college campuses. CIA-financed study centers were "trashed" at a cost of many thousands of dollars. New Left orators, armed with a sense of outrage and an encyclopedic ignorance of the intelligence community and its functions, instinctively assumed that the CIA was a major factor in the escalation of the war in Vietnam.

But the Pentagon study of the war, recently published by the New York Times proves conclusively that the Don Quixotes of the New Left have been charging at the wrong windmill. For many years and at critical stages of the escalation, the CIA and other members of the intelligence community, especially the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research repeatedly warned against the hazards involved, including flat predictions that the strategic bombing of North Vietnam would fail to accomplish its objectives.

Deceived Themselves

How these estimates and warnings were ignored by top policy-makers as they carried out their deliberate and "immaculate deception" of the American public is one of the more fascinating aspects of the Pentagon papers. But in deceiving the public, the decision-makers also deceived themselves, and eventually came to believe optimistic "military progress" reports, released to the public as based on the "latest intelligence," when, in fact at the highest level, the estimates were based on "snowed out" from the field, including typical "snow-

Harold Wilson, when appointed shadow Foreign Secretary, rushed to Washington to assure President Kennedy that Labor would stand four-square behind the U.S. in the Far East. There is no evidence that he subjected American intentions to any very close scrutiny. He recognized a fellow Boy Scout when he saw one, and did not scruple to borrow the Kennedy overblown rhetoric in explaining to doubting colleagues the nature of Britain's East of Suez peace-keeping mission.

job" briefings in Saigon, deceived only those officials, either civilian or military, who wanted to believe them.

What is the "intelligence community"? How is it organized and what role should it play in decision-making at the national level in such foreign entanglements as the war in Vietnam? The answers to these questions have been cloaked in secrecy when they should be a matter of public knowledge.

To begin with the basic institutions, the U.S. intelligence community is made up of the separate agencies of such key government departments as State and Defense, the National Security Agency, and the CIA, which has the overall responsibility for "coordinating, evaluating, and disseminating intelligence affecting the national security."

"First Line Of Defense"

It has often been said that "intelligence is the first line of national defense." Most citizens are vaguely aware that foreign policy and military decisions are made by the President with the advice of his secretaries of State and Defense, based, in theory at least, on the best information available to experts throughout the government. The collection, evaluation and dissemination of such information is one of the primary functions of intelligence.

But in foreign and military affairs, strategic decisions should also take into account careful estimates of the capabilities and probable courses of action of friends, allies, neutrals and "enemies." The production of such national estimates is a second major function of the entire intelligence community, although the board of estimates in the CIA coordinates the individual agency contributions and disseminates the final results.

As a rule, the various intelligence agencies are staffed on the working level by thousands of anonymous civil servants who are seldom equaled elsewhere in either government or private enterprise.

Many of the men on the CIA's Board of National Estimates and its staff have more than two decades of intelligence experience. Better than 90 per cent of the officials on this top echelon have advanced academic degrees in history, political science, or economics directly pertinent to their work. About 75 per cent have enhanced their area and subject knowledge by living overseas. The estimators in State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research are equally competent and well-qualified.

Advice To President

On the national level daily and weekly reports are promptly distributed to the President and his chief advisers, and special estimates or briefings are made as required in response to developing crises. In short, the intelligence community provides the decision-maker with carefully evaluated information and estimates which he can either use for guidance or disregard.

History is full of illustrations how national leaders have ignored the estimates of the intelligence agencies with disastrous results. Napoleon's intelligence aide, the Marquis de Caulaincourt, explained why, for obvious strategic reasons, the planned invasion of Russia would fail. His advice was ignored.

A century later, Adolph Hitler's ambassador in Russia, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, used the same reasoning in his estimate of why Hitler's plan would fail. His warning was also ignored and Hitler launched his invasion, which was widely heralded as the final showdown in his lifelong crusade against world communism. The campaign ultimately floundered in a sea of blood—20 million Russian casualties alone, not to mention German losses which also ran into the millions.

Nothing quite as dramatic has happened since.

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CIA Report Bill Backed In Senate

By RICHARD DUDMAN
Chief Washington Correspondent
of the Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON, July 8 — Senator John Sherman Cooper (Rep.), Kentucky, has obtained strong bipartisan backing for a proposal to require the Central Intelligence Agency to report to Congress as well as to the Executive Branch.

Cooper, a moderate opponent of the Vietnam War and of the antiballistic missile system, introduced his proposal yesterday as an amendment to the National Security Act of 1947, which created the Department of Defense, the National Security Council and the CIA.

Senators Stuart Symington (Dem.), Missouri, J. William Fulbright (Dem.), Arkansas, and Jacob K. Javits (Rep.), New York, announced their support for the measure on the Senate floor. Fulbright spoke of holding hearings on the proposal.

Symington, chairman of a foreign relations subcommittee on overseas commitments, told of difficulties he had had in obtaining full information about secret U.S. military preparations and operations abroad, including the clandestine warfare being conducted in Laos.

Symington noted that he was a member of the Foreign Relations, Armed Services and Joint Atomic Energy committees. He said that his best information had been obtained from the last of these, attributing that fact to a requirement in the Atomic Energy Act that the Atomic Energy Commission keep Congress "fully and currently" informed.

Cooper used that phrase in his proposed amendment on the CIA. An aid said that Cooper had found CIA information generally reliable on such matters as Soviet military preparedness and the Indochina War but had noted that it was rendered only in response to specific questions.

Under his amendment, the CIA would have to take the initiative in sending Congress its analyses of problems of foreign policy and national security.

The aid said that Cooper had been considering such a measure for several years. He said the publication of the Pentagon papers had demonstrated once more the value of CIA reports and probably had broadened support in Congress for a requirement to make them available.

In a Senate speech, Cooper proposed that the CIA be required to make regular and special reports to the House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs committees and to the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees. Additional special reports could be requested by the committees.

Any member of Congress or designated member of his staff would have access to the information. All such persons would be subject to security requirements such as those in the Executive Branch.

Cooper said that the best information should be available to the Executive and Legislative branches as a basis for national decisions involving "vast amounts of money, the deployment of weapons whose purpose is to deter war yet can destroy all life on earth, the stationing of American troops in other countries and their use in combat, and binding commitments to foreign nations."

Two other Senators offered proposals relating to the CIA.


George S. McGovern (Dem.), South Dakota, suggested that expenditures and appropriations for the intelligence agency appear as a single line item in the budget. Agency funds now are concealed in other items in the budget.

Three bills were introduced by Senator Clifford P. Case (Rep.), New Jersey, to limit covert use of funds and military equipment by the CIA for

fielding foreign troops in Laos or elsewhere without specific approval by Congress.

Case said they were designed "to place some outside control on what has been the free-wheeling operation of the Executive Branch in carrying on foreign policy and even waging foreign wars."

Meanwhile, the House rejected a proposal that the Administration be required to tell it



John Sherman Cooper

what the military and CIA were doing in Laos.

By a vote of 261 to 116, members tabled — and thus killed — a resolution introduced by Representative Paul N. McCloskey (Rep.), California, that would have ordered the Secretary of State to furnish the House with the policy guidelines given to the U.S. ambassador in Laos.

The ambassador has responsibility for overseeing the clandestine military operations in Laos aimed at assisting the royal Laotian government in its struggle with the Pathet Lao.

William B. Macomber Jr., deputy under secretary of state, clashed yesterday with McCloskey over whether the Department of State was directing U.S. bombing attacks in Laos.

Macomber denied the allegation and suggested that if McCloskey wanted to pursue the issue he ought to invite an East Asia expert from the State Department to testify.

The exchange occurred as Macomber testified before a House foreign affairs subcommittee on ways to improve declassification of Government records by the State Department.

Macomber said 10 to 12 years' retention ought to be adequate to protect Government secrets while not being so long as to make it impossible to know about operations.

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KEY VIETNAM TE THE KENNEDY YE

Following are texts of key documents accompanying the Pentagon's study of the Vietnam war, dealing with the Administration of President John F. Kennedy up to the events that brought the overthrow of President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963. Except where excerpting is specified, the documents are printed verbatim, with only unmistakable typographical errors corrected.

U.S. Ambassador's '60 Analysis Of Threats to Saigon Regime

Cablegram from Elbridge Durbrow, United States Ambassador in Saigon, to Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, Sept. 16, 1960.

As indicated our 495 and 533 Diem regime confronted by two separate but related dangers. Danger from demonstrations or coup attempt in Saigon could occur earlier; likely to be predominantly non-Communist in origin but Communists can be expected to endeavor infiltrate and exploit any such attempt. Even more serious danger is gradual Viet Cong extension of control over countryside which, if current Communist progress continues, would mean loss free Viet-nam to Communists. These two dangers are related because Communist successes in rural areas embolden them to extend their activities to Saigon and because non-Communist temptation to engage in demonstrations or coup is partly motivated by sincere desire prevent Communist take-over in Viet-nam.

Essentially [word illegible] sets of measures required to meet these two dangers. For Saigon danger essentially political and psychological measures required. For countryside danger security measures as well as political, psychological and economic measures needed. However both sets measures should be carried out simultaneously and to some extent individual steps will be aimed at both dangers.

Security recommendations have been made in our 539 and other messages, including formation internal security council, centralized intelligence, etc. This message therefore deals with our political and economic recommendations. I realize some measures I am recommending are drastic and would be most [word illegible] for an ambassador to make under normal circumstances. But conditions here are by no means normal.

normal. Diem government is in quite serious danger. Therefore, in my opinion prompt and even drastic action is called for. I am well aware that Diem has in past demonstrated astute judgment and has survived other serious crises. Possibly his judgment will prove superior to ours this time, but I believe nevertheless we have no alternative but to give him our best judgment of what we believe is required to preserve his government. While Diem obviously resented my frank talks earlier this year and will probably resent even more suggestions outlined below, he has apparently acted on some of our earlier suggestions and might act on at least some of the following:

1. I would propose have frank and friendly talk with Diem and explain our serious concern about present situation and his political position. I would tell him that, while matters I am raising deal primarily with internal affairs, I would like to talk to him frankly and try to be as helpful as I can be giving him the considered judgment of myself and some of his friends in Washington on appropriate measures to assist him in present serious situation. (Believe it best not indicate talking under instructions.) I would particularly stress desirability of actions to broaden and increase his [word illegible] support prior to 1961 presidential elections required by constitution before end April. I would propose following actions to President:

2. Psychological shock effect is required to take initiative from Communist propagandists as well as non-Communist oppositionists and convince population government taking effective measures to deal with present situation. To achieve that effect following suggested:

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4. Permit National Assembly wider legislative initiative and area of genuine debate and bestow on it authority to conduct, with appropriate publicity, public investigations of any department of government with right to question officials. This step would have three-fold purpose: (A) find some mechanism for dis-

29 JUN 1971

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President Kennedy's Vietnam dilemma . .

Summary and analysis of Pentagon documents dealing with '62-'64 period

The following are excerpts from the text of the summary and analysis of that section of the Pentagon papers dealing with the evolution of the Vietnam war from 1962 to 1964.

A formal planning and budgetary process for the phased withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam was begun amid the euphoria and optimism of July, 1962, and was ended in the pessimism of March, 1964. Initially, the specific objectives were: (1) to draw down U.S. military personnel then engaged in advisory, training, and support efforts from an FY 64 peak of 12,000 to an FY 68 bottoming out of 1,500 (just HQ, MAAG); and (2) to reduce MAP from an FY 64 peak of \$180 million to an FY 69 base of \$40.8 million. South Vietnamese forces were to be trained to perform all the functions then being carried out by U.S. personnel.


What the U.S.G. was actually trying to accomplish during this period can be described in either or both of two ways: (1) a real desire and attempt to extricate the U.S. from direct military involvement in the war and to make it a war which the GVN would have to learn to win, and (2) straightforward contingency planning and the use of a political-managerial technique to slow down pressures for greater U.S. inputs. A blend of the wish embodied in the first explanation and the hard-headedness of the second seems plausible.

Needless to say, the phase-out never came to pass. The Diem coup with the resulting political instability and deterioration of the military situation soon were to lead U.S. decisionmakers to set aside this planning process. An ostensible cutback of 1,600 men did take place in December, 1963, but this was essentially an accounting exercise—and the U.S. force level prior to the reduction had already reached 16,732 in October, 1963. By December, 1964, U.S. strength had risen to 23,000 and further deployments were on the way.

What, then, did the whole phased withdrawal exercise accomplish? It may have impeded demands for more men and money, but this is doubtful. If the optimistic reports on the situation in SVN were to be believed, and they apparently were, little more would have been requested. It may have frightened the GVN, but it did not induce Diem or his successors to reform the political apparatus or make RVNAF fight harder. It may have contributed, however, to public charges about the administration's credibility and over-optimism about the end of the conflict.

Despite the carefully worded White House announcement of the phase-out policy on October 2, 1963, tentative Johnson administration judgments came to be regarded by the public as firm predictions. While this announcement made clear that the U.S. effort would continue "until the insurgency has been suppressed or until the national security forces of the GVN are capable of suppressing it," the public tended to focus on the prognosis which followed—"Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported their judgment that the major part of the U.S. military task can be completed by the end of 1965. . . ." In August, 1964, Mr. McNamara further explained the policy: "We have said—as a matter of fact, I say today—as our training missions are completed, we will bring back the training forces."


Quite apart from what was actually accomplished by the phase-out policy and the costs in terms of domestic political perception of administration statements on Vietnam there are some important lessons to be learned from the exercise. What was the



AP Photo

President Kennedy

Men in the middle



By a staff photographer

President Johnson

Inherited a whirlwind

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Continued

With 40 different nations involved, discussion is long and decisions come slow, but I am convinced that this kind of world dialogue is leading in the direction we must go to eventually solve our food distribution and farm income problems.

HILDA BRUNGOT—A DISTINGUISHED LEGISLATIVE RECORD

Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, rarely do I have the opportunity to share with my colleagues the story of anyone as remarkable as the New Hampshire General Court's venerable Republican legislator, Mrs. Hilda Brungot of Berlin, N.H.

Few legislators have contributed as much to our State. Few could exemplify as well the real meaning of the term "public servant."

The daughter of a Norwegian immigrant who himself served our State as a distinguished representative, Mrs. Brungot began her life in public service at 40 as a delegate to the New Hampshire Constitutional Convention in 1930.

That very same year she succeeded her father as a representative in the New Hampshire Legislature, beginning a record of service spanning 18 2-year terms, perhaps the longest legislative record of any woman in U.S. history.

Mrs. Brungot, now beyond her 80th birthday, could have chosen long ago to settle back into a less active role, but that would have wasted her valuable experience and insight. Instead she has found time to involve herself in a wide range of activities, and to this day few representatives in our State's legislature are more in evidence in committee and on the floor during important debates.

Mr. President, Mrs. Brungot grew up in more difficult times and was forced to quit school early in life and with stubborn Yankee independence educated herself. She was certainly successful, but just 4 years ago, at the age of 80, she took time out to formalize it all: she earned a high school diploma.

Mr. President, this mother of six and grandmother of many more has witnessed profound changes and momentous events during her years of service—the Great Depression, World War, the atomic age, and much more. Her perspective and youthful vigor is of great value, not only to her friends in the legislature, but to all who have come to know her.

As a New Hampshire citizen who greatly values her wisdom and greatly admires her steadfast dedication to the service of everyone in our State, I wish her well in the years ahead. May she serve our State and give us the benefit of her counsel for many years to come.

THE PENTAGON DOCUMENTS

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, portions of the Pentagon documents concerning the development of American military involvement in Indochina are becoming available in various leading newspapers.

I believe that the full Pentagon report should be made available to the Congress and the public without further delay. In the absence of a decision by the administration to release the documents, I am attempting to insert in the CONGRES-

SIONAL RECORD those documents and summaries appearing in the press.

Today, I am submitting documents and summaries appearing in the Boston Globe of June 22. They show that covert action against North Vietnam was ordered as early as 1961. They show that Vietnamization has been with us since 1968, thus revealing just how great a failure this 3-year policy has been. After 3 years of trying, we still have not been able to Vietnamize the war. Of course, it is just as immoral to do that as it is to carry it on with American forces.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the articles and summaries from the Boston Globe be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD as follows:

SECRET PENTAGON DOCUMENTS BARE JFK ROLE IN VIETNAM WAR—KENNEDY OK'D COVERT ACTION

(By Robert Healy)

Gen. Maxwell Taylor in October of 1961 advised President Kennedy in an "eyes only for the President" cable to send 8000 man US military task force into South Vietnam but he warned that the introduction of such a force "may increase tensions and risk escalation into a major war in Asia."

Gen. Taylor was special adviser to President Kennedy on Vietnam.

At the time of the Taylor mission, which took him and Walt Rostow, later to be President Johnson's chief adviser on national security affairs, and a group of state and defense department officials to South Vietnam, the United States had about 1000 soldiers in South Vietnam. They served as advisers to the South Vietnamese Army.

President Kennedy stepped up covert actions against North Vietnam and increased the number of advisers to 16,000 men before he was assassinated in November of 1963. He never committed a United States ground unit as Taylor recommended.

These disclosures were made in a portion of a secret Pentagon study on the origins of the war in Vietnam started in 1967 by then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. They were made available to the Boston Globe yesterday.

For the first time the Globe was making public the role of the Kennedy administration in the escalation of the war. Three earlier reports dealing with other phases of the war were published by the New York Times and two by the Washington Post before publication was halted by court injunctions.

As early as May 11, 1961, President Kennedy, according to the secret report, had approved programs for covert action which had been recommended by a Vietnam Task Force. Among these actions were:

- (1) Dispatch of agents into North Vietnam.
- (2) Aerial resupply of agents in North Vietnam through the use of civilian mercenary air crews.
- (3) Infiltration of special South Vietnam forces into Southeast Laos to locate and attack Communist bases and lines of communication.
- (4) Formulation of "networks of resistance, covert bases and teams for sabotage and light harassment" inside North Vietnam.
- (5) Conduct of overflights of North Vietnam for the purpose of dropping leaflets.

These covert actions which were approved by President Kennedy were contained, according to the Pentagon study, in a National Security Action Memorandum number 52.

About the time that the cable was received by President Kennedy, the President, according to the Pentagon study, directed (among other measures that we "initiate guerrilla

ground action, including the use of US advisers if necessary" against Communist aerial resupply missions in the vicinity of Tchepone (Sepone, Laos).

"He also directed the Department of State to prepare to publish its White Paper on DRV (North Vietnam) responsibility for aggression in SVN (South Vietnam)," the study showed.

In the Pentagon study's evaluation of the two cables sent to President Kennedy by Taylor, it said that the impression Taylor's choice of language leaves is that the support forces "were essentially already agreed to by the President before Taylor left Washington, and consequently his detailed justification went only to the kind of forces on which a decision was yet to be made—that is, ground forces liable—to become involved in direct engagements with the Viet Cong."

In his first cable of the mission (Oct. 15 to Nov. 2, 1961) sent from Saigon, Taylor wrote the President and the top officials at State and Defense: "My view is that we should put in a task force consisting largely of logistical troops for the purpose of participating in flood relief and at the same time of providing a U.S. military presence in VN capable of assuring Diem (President Ngo Dinh Diem) of our readiness to join him in a military showdown with the Viet Cong or Viet Minh. To relate the introduction of these troops to the needs of flood relief seems to me to offer considerable advantages in VN and abroad. It gives a specific humanitarian task as the prime reason for the coming of our troops. . . ."

Despite the Taylor recommendations for a U.S. task force, there was no hint publicly at that time out of the White House that the President would go along.

Upon his return from Vietnam Taylor said to newsmen that President Diem had assets available "to prevail against the Communist threat."

President Kennedy on the subject of Vietnam and the Taylor mission at a press conference on Feb. 14, 1962, said that President Diem had asked for additional assistance. The administration, he said, had detailed the support which the Viet Minh in the North were giving to this Communist insurgent movement and we have increased our assistance there. And we are supplying logistical assistance, transportation assistance, training, and we have a number of Americans who are taking part in that effort."

Kennedy did not mention the Taylor recommendations for a U.S. task force or whether the United States was considering one.

TERROR AND CRISIS

Taylor in his cable to the President said that Viet Cong forces one tenth the size of the South Vietnamese Army regulars could create conditions of frustration and terror which was certain to lead to a political crisis.

In his list of specifics Taylor said that the US government should support the effort to stop the Viet Cong" with equipment and with military units and personnel to do those tasks which the Armed Forces of Vietnam cannot perform in time."

Taylor recommended the troop commitment despite full recognition of what he listed as disadvantages. Among these:

"A. The strategic reserve of US forces is presently so weak that we can ill afford any detachment of forces to a peripheral area of the Communist bloc where they will be pinned down for an uncertain duration.

"B. Although US prestige is already engaged in SVN, it will become more so by the sending of troops.

"C. If the first contingent is not enough to accomplish the necessary results, it will be difficult to resist the pressure to reinforce. If the ultimate result sought is the closing of the frontiers and the clean-up of the insurgents within SVN, there is no limit to our

STATINT
STATINT

24 JUN 1971

U.S. Rejected First Viet-Pullout Advice

Key Rusk Aide Spurned by Top Kennedy Council

BY STUART H. LOORY

Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—Advised for the first time that the United States faced a can't-win situation in the Vietnam war, President John F. Kennedy's National Security Council in August, 1963, rejected the recommendation of a State Department expert on Vietnam to pull out honorably, the Pentagon's top-secret history of the war shows.

Instead, Secretary of State Dean Rusk put down such talk from one of his subordinates as "speculative," saying:

"It would be far better for us to start on the firm basis of two things—that we will not pull out of Vietnam until the war is won, and that we will not run a coup."

Overruled Expert Named

The expert overruled by Rusk was Paul M. Kattenburg, then head of the State Department's Vietnam Working Group, who had dealt with President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam for 10 years. Then-Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, among other important officials, backed Rusk's view, the account says.

The report on the session, held at the State Department and chaired by Rusk in President Kennedy's absence, is contained in a memorandum written by Marine Maj. Gen. Victor C. Krulak, then the Pentagon's top expert on counterinsurgency.

Krulak's memorandum is included in previously unpublished sections of the report that The Times has obtained. The sections are from the same Pentagon study that were the subject of previous stories in the New York Times, Washington Post and Boston Globe. It was prepared by a team of Pentagon analysts under a directive from McNamara in 1968. The analysts had access to documents only on file in the Defense Department. The analysts did not have access to the complete files at the White House or State Department.

The meeting Krulak describes was called as a "where-do-we-go-from-here" session after a group of Saigon generals failed to bring off a coup against the increasingly unpopular regime headed by Diem.

The meeting was a key session in the period from May to November, 1963, during which non-Communist opposition to the Diem regime grew rapidly and eventually boiled over into the overthrow of Diem and the assassination of him and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu on Nov. 2.

During the National Security Council session, Kattenburg advanced the suggestion that, in Krulak's words, "At this juncture it would be better for us to make the decision to get out honorably."

The complete text of Krulak's report on Kattenburg's presentation said:

"Mr. Kattenburg stated that as recently as last Thursday it was the belief of Ambassador (Henry Cabot) Lodge (Jr.) that, if we undertake to live with this repressive regime, with its bayonets at every street corner and its transparent negotiations with puppet

bonzes (Buddhist monks), we are going to be thrown out of the country in six months.

Would Not Separate

He stated that at this juncture it would be better for us to make the decision to get out honorably. He went on to say that, having been acquainted with Diem for 10 years, he was deeply disappointed in him, saying that he will not separate from his brother. It was Kattenburg's view that Diem will get little support from the military and, as time goes on, he will get less and less support and the country will go steadily downhill.

"Gen. (Maxwell D.) Taylor (then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) asked what Kattenburg meant when he said that we would be forced out of Vietnam within six months. Kattenburg replied that in from six months to a year, as people see we are losing the war, they will gradually go to the other side and we will be obliged to leave.

Rusk dismissed the view and McNamara agreed. Rusk then went on to say there was "good proof," in Krulak's term, that the war was being won. Lyndon Johnson agreed, saying that "from both a practical and a political viewpoint, it would be a disaster to pull out; that we should stop playing cops and robbers and get back to talking straight to the GVN (Saigon government), and that we should once again go about winning the war."

Sharply Critical

The Pentagon report on the meeting was sharply critical of the deliberations. It spoke of the officials' "rambling inability to focus the problem, indeed to reach common agreement on the nature of the problem."

The report continues:

"More importantly, however, the meeting is the first recorded occasion

At Honolulu parley

STATINTL

CIA played down US domino theory

By Darius S. Jhabvala
Globe Staff

A key Johnson Administration military adviser had proposed in 1964 that tactical nuclear weapons would have to be deployed if Communist Chinese forces entered the ground war in Vietnam. Admiral Harry D. Felt, then the commander in chief of the Pacific forces, emphatically demanded also that commanders be given the freedom to use such weapons "as had been assumed under various plans."

This question, among others, was discussed among his top advisers at the Honolulu conference, June 1-2, 1964.

Following the meeting, President Johnson asked his advisers the basic question: "Would the rest of Southeast Asia necessarily fall if Laos and South Vietnam came under North Vietnamese control?"

On June 9, the Board of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency, provided a response, stating:

"With the possible exception of Cambodia, it is likely that no nation in the area would quickly succumb to Communism as a result of the fall of Laos and South Vietnam. Furthermore, a continuation of the spread of Communism in the area would not be inexorable and any spread which did occur would take time -- time in which the total situation might change in any number of ways unfavorable to the Communist cause."

These and other details are part of the on Vietnam study that was made for Defense Department.

The State Department approached the Honolulu conference "with a basic assumption," namely "our point of departure is and must be that we cannot accept the overrunning of southeast Asia by Hanoi and Peking."

Beyond this, the discussions "were intended to help clarify issues with respect to exerting pressures against North Vietnam." The joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that "the US should seek through military actions to accomplish destruction of the North Vietnamese will and capabilities as necessary to compel the Democratic Government of Vietnam to cease providing support to the insurgents in South Vietnam and Laos."

LIMITED ACTION

However, the JCS went on to note that "some current thinking appears to dismiss the objective in favor of a lesser objective, one visualizing limited military action which, hopefully, would cause the North Vietnamese to decide to terminate their subversive support."

During discussions of the extent of new military action, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge "argued in favor of attacks on north." He is reported to have stated "his conviction that most support for the Viet Cong would fade as soon as some 'counter-terrorism measures' were begun against DRV."

Discussions then turned to the desirability of obtaining a congressional resolution prior to wider US action. Lodge felt that it would not be necessary, since the US response would be on a "tit-for-tat" basis. But Defense Secretary McNamara, Rusk and CIA Director John McCone all argued in favor of the resolution.

Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, then raised "the final possibility" of Chinese involvement. Were that to occur, the allies would require "seven ground divisions."

"Secretary McNamara then went on to say that the possibility of major ground action also led to a serious question of having to use nuclear weapons at some point," the reports points out. "Admiral Felt responded emphatically that there was no possible way to hold off the Communists on the ground without the use of tactical nuclear weapons and that it was essential that the commanders be given freedom to use these as had been assumed under various plans," it added.

Gen. Taylor was "more doubtful as to the existence or at least to the degree of the nuclear weapon requirement."

"The point, the report concluded, 'was not really followed up.'"

Times Book On Viet Data Selling Fast

STATINTL

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer
"The Pentagon Papers" went on sale here yesterday with the government lining up as one of the biggest buyers of the once-secret documents.

The Pentagon and the CIA ordered nearly 100 copies of the paperback book, according to the Washington distributor and local book-sellers.

The publisher of the newspaper series originally printed in The New York Times said the Navy ordered 2,000 more books direct from the printing plant.

"It's only been on sale for a few hours and it's already in a league with 'The French Lieutenant's Woman' and 'The Gang That Couldn't Shoot Straight,'" said Ken Terhune of District News Co., the Washington-area distributor.

In New York, at the headquarters of the book's publisher, Bantam Books, Inc., there was even more enthusiasm. Brisk orders from Europe, especially West Germany, the publishing house said, are even outdistancing "Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Sex," at least in English.

Trucks for the Washington distributor began picking up their first order of 12,500 copies at Dulles International Airport at 3 a.m. By midafternoon, Terhune said, they were all on the book-racks with another batch of 25,000 on the way.

"As far as a New York Times book goes," he said, "it's far better than anything we've ever handled."

The CIA ordered 25 copies direct from District News. Close to 1,000 more went on sale at shops in the Pentagon, including the newsstand where Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird's office asked for "about 20" copies and other defense agencies ordered some 30 more.

"It's really been quite remarkable," said Esther Margolis of Bantam Books, where executives had initially contemplated a first printing of 175,000. Instead, they settled on 500,000 and yesterday afternoon decided on a second printing of 50,000.

The first of the \$2.25 paperback editions began rolling off the presses at Bantam's Chicago plant only Wednesday night.

"Foreign interest," Miss Margolis said, "has been extraordinarily high. In West Germany, we got orders for 15,000. That's the highest ever for a Bantam book there, including 'Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Sex,' 'Valley of the Dolls,' and 'Portnoy's Complaint.'"

Stars and Stripes, she added, ordered 2,000 copies for sale at armed forces PX stores in Europe and the U.S. Information Agency put in for 250, presumably for its libraries around the world.

On the level of just plain readers, Terhune said that some of Washington's larger bookshops and department stores reported selling as many as 100 copies of the secret Vietnam war history within an hour or two.

But some were blasé. "It's just a compilation of articles from The New York Times," said a spokesman for the Soviet embassy. "I don't see the necessity of buying it now." Of the CIA's order, he said with a chuckle, "Maybe they have more money than we have."

There was also, Miss Margolis said, a strange silence from Saigon. "We have a distributor in South Vietnam," she reported, "but our export department cabled him yesterday for the third time. We haven't gotten any answer yet, which is sort of unusual."

DAYTON, OHIO
NEWS

MAY 28 1971

E - 161,249

S - 215,360

Mysterious Missile Sites Complicate the Arms Race

The Defense department and the Central Intelligence agency are arguing over the meaning of some holes in the ground, like ancients interpreting chicken entrails. The issue is as important as it is confusing, and congressional action on it could either commit billions more to nuclear weaponry or endanger the security of us all.

The holes, 60 of them, are in Soviet missile fields, and they are larger than any other holes our spy satellites have ever spotted. This has led the Defense department to conclude that the Russians are preparing sites for a new generation of nuclear missiles—perhaps one that carries several independently-targeted H-bombs in its nose.

On March 10 Secretary Melvin Laird confirmed that "the Soviet Union is involved in a new — and apparently extensive—ICBM construction program." He said the Pentagon might ask Congress for a supplemental appropriation to counter the threat.

Now the New York Times reports that the CIA has rejected the Laird analysis. CIA experts, says the Times, have concluded the larger holes are for concrete liners meant to "harden" missile sites against enemy strikes—a defensive tactic

the United States has already employed at its Minuteman sites.

Evidence for this is that most of the larger holes have been dug in existing SS11 missile fields. SS11s are relatively small missiles, and arms experts say there is no reason why huge new missiles would be placed among them. Also, the CIA reportedly has pictures of concrete liners which have already arrived at the sites. The liners are not big enough around to accommodate large missile.

It comes down to a question of intention. If the Soviet goal is to acquire a first-strike capability that would render the United States unable to respond to a surprise attack, we have no choice but to keep a jump ahead of their nuclear technology, and the jumps go by billions of dollars.

The confusion is still another reason for the United States to press the Russians hard in the strategic arms negotiations. If the Soviet Union is not plotting for a first-strike advantage, it has little reason to hesitate about limiting offensive weapons. A treaty would spare Russia the vast new spending that would be forced on it if Washington mistakes refurbished silos for new missiles and paces the arms race into another lap.

EUA

O discreto Helms

"Ele nos comunica 90% das informações de que dispõe e nos deixa adivinhar o resto." A opinião é de um senador do Partido Republicano e traduz bem o sucesso alcançado por Richard Helms, atual diretor da CIA, na difícil tarefa de fazer amigos. Helms é realmente um homem de grande tato político que tem o dom raro de inspirar confiança inclusive àqueles que, por suas funções, poderiam desconfiar dele.

Sua carreira -- como seria de esperar num êculo de James Bond, muito mais eficiente no uso do cérebro do que no manejo do revólver -- foi obscura até quando se viu guindado à chefia da

Agência Central de Inteligência. Mas poucas pessoas em todo o mundo participaram nos últimos vinte anos tão ativamente da luta travada nos bastidores da política internacional. Entre as muitas proezas de Helms, há uma de que ele se orgulha de modo especial. Ela se relaciona com um episódio famoso: a entrega pela CIA, ao *The New York Times*, em junho de 1956, do informe secreto apresentado por Nikita Krushchev ao XX Congresso do PCUS. O documento explodiu como uma bomba no mundo ocidental e a sua divulgação apressou o processo de desestalinização. Entretanto, a parte final do texto era falsa. Para aprofundar as dissensões internas no campo comunista e os atritos entre Washington e Moscou, a CIA acrescentou trinta e dois pontos ao relatório de Krushchev. O efeito foi sensacional. Mais tarde, peritos em "luremlinologia" procederam a uma análise minuciosa das passagens forjadas e chegaram à conclusão de que o estilo era perfeitamente idêntico ao do documento, assemelhando-se ao de Krushchev como duas gotas de água entre si. Dick Helms foi o autor principal da falsificação.

Um policial diferente. Helms tem as maneiras de um *gentleman*, o *savoir faire* de um diplomata de carreira e sabe sorrir e falar como um americano da classe média. Em pouco tempo, construiu uma reputação de honestidade e franqueza que favoreceu a sua imagem. Contrariamente a seus predecessores, não é um homem rico e, em vez de se fechar numa torre de marfim, mantém uma vida social intensa, contando numerosos amigos entre a classe política.

Oficialmente, tem agora uma tripla responsabilidade: é diretor da CIA, presidente do United States Intelligence Board e diretor do Serviço de Informações Central (DCI). Cabe-lhe a tarefa delicada de filtrar e sintetizar as infor-


mações colhidas pelos serviços secretos americanos e levá-las, depois, ao conhecimento do Presidente da República e do Congresso. Quando o Conselho Nacional de Segurança se reúne, é ele quem abre as sessões, com um informe sobre a situação existente em todas as áreas nevralgicas do mundo.

Computadores e golpes. O que da CIA não corresponde à imagem que dele formam os leitores de romances de espionagem. É um sólido edifício de oito andares que se eleva às margens do Potomac, em Langley, um subúrbio de Washington. Assinalam os visitantes que

nos corredores e salas não é possível ver-se um revólver. Em contrapartida, há no prédio um grande número de computadores em funcionamento permanente. Milhões de fichas perfuradas são digeridas todos os dias por essas máquinas aperfeiçoadíssimas. Helms gosta de dizer que não existe no mundo um sistema de coleta de informações tão gigantesco e perfeito.

Entretanto, o próprio gigantismo da CIA e a sua independência acabam assustando até os que dela precisam. A Agência é um Estado dentro do Estado. Tem a sua política e não espera ordens para se lançar em iniciativas que geram crises mundiais. E ninguém, nem mesmo o Presidente dos EUA, pode estabelecer com exatidão a fronteira das atividades da Agência. Já fazem parte da história as notícias sobre sua presença na derrubada do regime de Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán na Guatemala, em 1954; na preparação do malogrado ataque a Cuba, em 1961; no golpe contra Ngo Dinh Diem, em Saigon, em 1963; e na luta antiguerrilha que terminou com a morte de "Che" Guevara, em 1967, na Bolívia. Mas a lenda tecida em torno da CIA atingiu tamanhas proporções que a Agência é responsabilizada pela quase totalidade dos golpes de Estado ocorridos em países do Terceiro Mundo. Até nos EUA, políticos e jornalistas denunciaram o seu envolvimento na derrubada de Norodom Sihanouk, no assassinio do General René Schneider, no seqüestro de Pedro Aramburu e na corrupção de dirigentes de conhecidas fundações e da Associação Nacional de Estudantes (NSA). Tornou-se impossível marcar a linha divisória entre a verdade e a fantasia.

A desconfiança de Nixon. De certo modo, a CIA é vítima da aura de mau maquiavelismo que se forjou em volta de seu nome. Segundo a revista *Le Nouvel Observateur*, a *objetividade* do novo chefe da CIA estaria preocupando o Presidente Nixon que teria encarregado um de seus amigos o General Cushman, de mantê-lo de baixo de olho. Helms, na opinião de alguns observadores, considera um esbanjamento a construção do sistema ABM, de mísseis antimísseis, cujo custo total será provavelmente de 40 bilhões de dólares. Realista, teme muito menos a URSS do que a China -- apesar da nova diplomacia de sorrisos de Mao Tsé-tung -- e as ameaças de subversão no Terceiro Mundo.



Richard Helms, muito tempo na penumbra

STATINTL

Computer parley hears the voice of peace

By RICK NAGIN

ATLANTIC CITY, May 19—The Computer People for Peace held an anti-war rally here today on the boardwalk in front of Convention Hall where the Spring Joint Computer Conference (SJCC) was holding its annual meeting.

The SJCC brings together members of all computer professional societies to discuss latest developments and examine displays of new machinery.

About 10,000 people, nearly all white men representing the corporations, universities, various police and governmental agencies, the CIA and the FBI, attended the conference. The theme of the conference was "Responsibility."

Speaking at the anti-war rally, attorney Flo Kennedy quoted the SJCC program and stated that the responsibility referred to was obviously responsibility to the military-industrial complex establishment (MICE).

Hundreds at rally

Several hundred people at the rally cheered as speakers exposed the involvement of the computer industry in racism, repression and war.

The Computer People for Peace (CPP) yesterday demanded the right to speak at the SJCC session on "computers in law enforcement," and to expose the repressive threats posed by police use of advanced computer technology. They were refused but won the right to ask questions at an expanded session, after speeches by Lt. Daniel Cawley of the New York City Police Department, and by Herbert Avram, who discussed a computer system he developed for the CIA.

Avram refused to discuss the CIA's interest in his system, when asked by the CPP.

Lt. Jerome Daunt of the FBI had been scheduled to discuss the National Crime Information Center, a central computer connecting local police departments in all states with the FBI, but he did not show up. The CPP had prepared a warrant to seize him on a citizen's arrest for conspiracy to violate the civil rights of the American people.

The CPP also won the right to hold its own session, which included panels on data banks, minority groups and women in the industry, computers in the military, unemployment and health systems.

CIA Reference Aids Released

In March 1972, the Library of Congress began public dissemination of selected Central Intelligence Agency reference aids through its Document Expediting Project (DOCEX).

DOCEX provides subscribers (university, college, State, and public libraries) with U.S. Government publications not available for purchase either at the Government Printing Office or at the issuing agency. The subscriber selects the publications desired at an annual fee ranging from \$175 to \$525. No back issues are available.

CIA reference aids planned under this service will include:

- Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments
- Directory of Soviet Officials, Vol. I - National Organizations
- Directory of Soviet Officials, Vol. II - RSFSR (Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic)
- Directory of Headquarters Personnel, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Appearances of Soviet Leaders
- Directory of People's Republic of China Officials
- Appearances and Activities of Leading Personalities of the People's Republic of China
- Directory of Albanian Officials
- Directory of Bulgarian Officials
- Directory of Czechoslovak Officials
- Directory of Hungarian Officials
- Directory of Polish Officials
- Directory of Romanian Officials
- Directory of Yugoslav Officials
- Directory of East German Officials
- Directory of Cuban Officials
- Leadership Wall Charts
- Directory of Ukrainian Officials

Inquiries concerning these publications should be addressed to:

Documentation Expediting Project
(DOCEX)
Exchange and Gift Division
Library of Congress
Washington, D.C. 20540

M - 240,275
S - 674,302



Latest fad among antiwar people in this area is to use the telephone credit card number of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to make long-distance phone calls. Only it isn't the right number.

The number in question is being passed by word of mouth and the underground press. I've gotten it from four different sources. In each case, I've gleefully been told that it is a marvelous way to plague the CIA and to register an off-beat complaint against the war in Vietnam.

Well, it's also a marvelous way to go to jail and/or pay a fine. There's a federal law against fraudulent use of a telephone credit card. It carries a maximum of five years and \$1,000 fine. The penalty depends on how much the call costs. Under \$100 it's a misdemeanor (90 days) and more than \$100 it's a felony (up to five years).

"Wait until the CIA gets the phone bill," said one enthusiastic user. "The number's been spread all over the country and people are calling all over the world on it. It should get them to take notice." It also should get the taxpayers who aren't getting free long-distance phone calls to take notice. I mean, where does the money come from?

I contacted the CIA, located just outside Washington, D.C., and a spokesman said he hadn't heard of any such use of any telephone credit numbers. Knowing the CIA, that doesn't mean much. They are inclined not to have heard "officially" about anything.

Our Washington Bureau did some checking, however, and determined that the number is not of Washington, but of New York City. It is being investigated by the New York security office of the phone company.

The number does, indeed, belong to a legitimate credit card. The telephone company has a code known to all operators to determine quickly if a card is right. Most such numbers have 10 digits and a final letter of the alphabet. The letter is a code for one of the digits, and that must match before a call will be placed.

A spokesman for Northwestern Bell, Wyman Thorson, checked out the number for me. He determined that it is in New York and that it doesn't belong to the CIA. He could not tell me to whom or what it belongs, except that it has nothing to do with the government.

So, it's another hoax like that of actor Paul Newman. A number purporting to be his is still being passed about the country. The story there is that he has offered it for anyone's use. He denies it, and the telephone company reports it's not even his number.

SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.

EXAMINER

E - 204,749

EXAMINER & CHRONICLE

S - 640,004

APR 2 1 1971

Bob Considine

A Proper War Requires a Map

I don't know how you feel about it, but I'm worried about the big change that is taking place in this country. We haven't gotten into either the war in Pakistan or the one in Ceylon. This is the first time in a generation or two that we haven't joined in other people's wars.

That's not the America I knew, man and boy. Makes a taxpayer want to hang his head in shame.

What have we got against the Pakistani people and the Ceyloneses? Why should we let these people fight their wars without our going in there and helping them?

It's just not like us, and I plan to vote against this administration at the earliest opportunity for depriving us of our traditional duty to intervene.

Pretty soon we're going to have no use for all our troops and 7½ ton bombs, when Vietnam shuts down about the year 2000 A.D. We'll feel like fools if we don't have a war to join and people to protect from godless atheism and bring into the eternal sunshine of the Free World. Right?

We can't let opportunities like Pakistan and Ceylon slip out of our fingers, as if we were some kind of dolts like the Russians, Red Chinese, Japanese, West Germans, Italians, English, French, Scandinavians, Swiss, the Vaticanese and other thriving peoples who are too dumb to rush off to every war that pops its head.

* * *

I CALLED the Pentagon today, trying to get a clue to our uncharacteristic conduct in the case of the snubbed wars in Pakistan and Ceylon and finally found a general who would talk. I asked him point blank, "General, how come we don't send troops to Dinajpur, Lalmanirhat and support Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike? Don't we owe some allegiance to Dudley Senanayake? What's our position on Nagalingen Sanmugathasan? Are we eschewing Rohana Wijiwere? When are we going to shore up the Sri Lanka Party?"

The general coughed nervously for a time, then sputtered, "Will you spell that, sir?" He thought I was Sen. Fulbright.

"Okay," I said. "Shore up. S-h-o-r-e-u-p."

"Well, Toots," he said, "don't mention this to any egotistical exemplar of the Eastern Establishment, or cowardly commentator on CBS, but we just can't send our advisors, B-52's, F-4's, F-105's, Hueys, C-130's, defoliators, aircraft carriers, PXs and Bob Hope in there until we get a few things straightened out."

Like what, he was asked.

"Well, like finding out just where the fighting is going on," the general said. "The only maps we have, so far, are from an Esso gas station in Hagerstown, Md. where I live. I've asked the CIA to check, but I suspect they may be a little outdated. All they say about that part of the world is that it's all India, and one other thing."

"What's that?"

"Don't drink the water."

"Where's that leave us, high and dry without a war to send troops and stuff to?"

* * *

"DON'T YOU WORRY, Toots," the general boomed. "Just as soon as we find out where this fightin's happened, and how to spell the names, by golly we'll jump in there with both feet. We can't let those people go down the drain, can we?"

"Which people?" I asked.

"You know very well which people," he thundered.

"The people we'll go all out for, to save them from being taken over by atheistic hordes from the West — or is it the East? Moreover, we'll send the vice president over there to give morale talks to the troops, if necessary, plus a brand new USO show featuring Martha Raye AND Jane Fonda.

I thanked him, and sent my old war correspondent's uniform to the tailor's to have it let out.

STATINTL

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Adm. Moorer Aids Inter-Agency Spies

STATINTL

By Jack Anderson

International espionage is seldom as efficient as the inter-departmental spying that goes on in Washington.

The rivalry between some government departments is so intense that they spy on one another like suspicious spouses. The armed forces, for instance, watch each other jealously. The Central Intelligence Agency never makes a move without the Defense Intelligence Agency keeping close surveillance. And when a State Department employee enters the Pentagon he takes the same precautions as if he were entering enemy territory.

No daily document is more sensitive than "The President's Daily Intelligence Briefing," which the CIA prepares for President Nixon. It is loaded with SI (Special Intelligence) items, country by country, on long sheets tucked into a white folder with blue lettering.

To possess a copy of the President's private intelligence digest is the ultimate status symbol. Those who see it are men of consequence, indeed. But for the DIA, which is eager to know what the CIA knows, access to this exclusive document is a matter of utmost priority.

Our own spies tell us that

the DIA regularly gets a copy. It is smuggled to them by Adm. Thomas Moorer, the joint chiefs' chairman, who has sufficient standing to get on the distribution list.

To make unauthorized copies of this sensitive presidential digest is akin to counterfeiting holy writ. Yet our spies have spotted a Moorer aide, who is entrusted with the admiral's eyes-only messages, furtively running off copies on a DIA copying machine.

Another supersecret document is the State Department's intelligence round-up from embassies around the world. The department guards this so jealously that it is stamped, "NODIS," which means it isn't supposed to be distributed outside State's own elite.

What they don't know, however, is that a Pentagon pigeon in their midst runs off unauthorized copies and sneaks them in a plain brown manila envelope to the joint chiefs chairman and the DIA director.

Thus do government agencies, in the best cloak-and-dagger tradition, snoop upon one another.

18 APR 1971

STATINTL

Capitol Punishment

Ping-Pong Cap

By Art Buchwald

STATINTL

It's very rare that the CIA gets caught flatfooted, but the other day when Red China invited the United States to send a table-tennis team to Peking, the Central Intelligence Agency discovered it had no champion ping-pong players in the organization whom it could send along on the trip.

CIA officials were going crazy trying to find someone before the U.S. team left for Peking last Saturday.

In panic, the CIA officials decided to hold a crash program in ping-pong. Neighbors who live around Langley, Va., where the top-secret agency is located, reported seeing truckloads of ping-pong tables going through the gates.

They have reported that they can't sleep at night because of the noise of thousands of balls being hit back and forth across the tables set up in the CIA gymnasium.

Any agent who ever played ping-pong in boy's camp or at the beach had been given leave from his regular duties and brought to Langley in hopes he might be developed into a champion ping-pong player before the U.S. team took off for Peking.

The CIA also held an Employees' Ping-Pong Tournament during lunch hour with cash prizes of up to \$100,000 of unaccountable funds to encourage more people to take up the sport.

Yet, despite these desperate measures, officials of the agency are pessimistic that they'll be able to develop anybody worthy of playing Red China at table tennis.

"What difference does it make if he isn't a champion?" I asked a CIA official.

"We have a serious problem," he said. "This is the first time we're playing Red China at any sport. Table tennis is the most important game in China."

"The USIA and the State Department want the United States to field the best team it can find, because they believe that if we can defeat the Chinese at ping-pong, it would be the greatest propaganda victory of the Cold War."

"On the other hand, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CIA feel it would be better to send a mediocre team and risk defeat in exchange for finding out what Mao-Tse-Tung is really thinking."

"The ideal, of course, would be to send a champion ping-pong player who also can figure out what is going on in Peking. But so far we can't find anybody."

"Why is that?" I asked. "Surely in this vast organization you must have some excellent table-tennis players."

"Unfortunately, most of our agents are golfers," he said sadly. "We also have some tennis players and a few people who play croquet. But no one here ever thought to recruit ping-pong players."

"Couldn't you borrow a champion player from another agency of the government?"

"The only one who could have qualified was a man who worked for the FBI and had won the intercollegiate ping-pong championship of 1956. But, unfortunately, he was fired a month ago for telling a friend he didn't like J. Edgar Hoover's barber."

"Then it looks like the United States table tennis team may have to go to Peking without CIA representation?" I said.

"Unless we can come up with a sleeper," the official said. "Our recruiters are out on the college campuses right now and their orders are to find someone, anyone. It doesn't make any difference if he can pass a security clearance, as long as he has a vicious backhand."

"Will anyone be punished because the CIA was unprepared to provide an agent for the Red China table tennis tournament?" I asked.

"Our personnel director was demoted and transferred to Iceland the other day, but at the last minute President Nixon commuted his sentence."

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REPRODUCED FROM THE CIA COLLECTION

Mazine Cheshire is ill. Her VIP column will resume when she returns.



WASHINGTON
SECURITY


Since the recent bomb explosion in the Capitol Building, Washington officials have tightened security on the handful of locations under streets that conceal a massive crossroads of vital electric lines.

On the surface these super-sensitive locations look like any other metropolitan or urban street corners. But, in fact, their manholes open into a massive complex of telephone lines -- including in some cases concrete-enclosed CIA cables, also sanitary and storm sewers, gas and water mains, steam heating pipes, electric power cables and some White House lines.

As one security official said: "If anyone asked us questions about these crossroads locations -- without a clear 'need to know' we'd become mighty interested in him and his background and activity."

And as a new security measure at the White House, everyone who walks on the south lawn is now under constant surveillance by two high-power, closed-circuit TV cameras with long-range zoom lenses. Their location is a secret, and you will never be able to spot them.

STATINTL



Hallicrafter's four-band Star Quest is typical of modern receivers you might use for shortwave. It comes assembled for about \$60.

HOW TO ENJOY

Worldwide Adventures on the Airwaves

Via shortwave, you can bring radio's pirates, bootleggers, even spies into your home

By LEN LUCKWALTER

Captain Kidd, Dutch Schultz, and Benedict Arnold are dead, you say? Sure, but the likes of these old seaundrels are still alive and well on the international airwaves. Their weapons are powerful transmitters which often broadcast on a global scale. Their escapades trouble government officials. But the blackguards can be the delight of shortwave listeners.

You don't need a pile of electronic gear to listen in. You can enjoy the pastime with a simple portable that captures strong signals on nothing more than a telescoping whip sticking out of the case. The seasoned hobbyist, though, can fully enjoy an outdoor antenna (a wire 20 to 100 feet long) or goes in for more expen-

sive receiving equipment with special accessories for cutting interference.

The low-cost portable will pick up powerful international broadcasters like BBC, Radio Moscow, and Japan's NHK; the spicy stations may call for a more sensitive instrument.

But whatever your choice, once you have your receiver you can join thousands of fellow listeners who attempt to eavesdrop on rogue broadcasters.

One character is the "pirate," who sails a radio station just outside the 12-mile territorial limit of a country,

Continued

International Shortwave: to take your play to the

Frequency (MHz)	Station	Affiliation	Listener Area
3.500, 4.355	Unknown	CIA	S.E. Asia
2.410, 3.900, 4.365	Radio Liberated Army	Viet Cong	S.E. Asia
11.697, 9.555	PeyKerian	Radio Sofia (Bulgaria)	Middle East
9.555, 11.410	Kiss Me Honey (music jammer)	Radio Baghdad	Middle East
8.340	Radio Portugal Libre	Radio Moscow	North America
13.200, 13.300	Radio Euzkadi	Basque Region of Spain	Europe, N. America
15.030, 15.100	Radio Espana Independiente	Radio Moscow	Europe
17.750, 6.930, 7.050	Radio Libandad, LaVoz Anti-Com		South, Central America
1.405, 7.365	Ministries de America	Unknown	Central, South America
9.300, 11.835, 15.030	Radio Americas	CIA	Central, South America
1.157, 6.050	Radio Havana	Cuba	Central, South America
6.135	Radio of S. Vietnam	Viet Cong	S.E. Asia
10.030, 10.015	Free Transmitter of Czechoslovakia	Czech Nationalists	Europe, North America
7.345			

Russell Kirk

Computer Fears? Build 'Right To Print-Out'

During the past year, many of the people involved in the computer business have been worrying about the menace to privacy and freedom which is presented by centralized banks of computerized information.

If the proposed National Data Bank takes on reality, will every citizen of these United States be in danger of harassment, meddling—and possibly worse—by agencies of government and others who have access to such data?

Some months ago, the editor of *Computers and Automation*, a journal of that trade, actually proposed to throw a wrench into the machinery, unless measures are taken to protect the privacy of people about whom data has been gathered. "As a last resort," he wrote, "we should remember that large files are very vulnerable to error." And, as this gentleman (Edmund C. Berkeley) went on, computers can be induced to err:

"It would be highly desirable for everyone engaged in an unpopular activity to adopt three names and three Social Security numbers. This ought to throw any data system, computerized or not, into convulsions. Furthermore, if one adopted a new name and a new Social Security number every four months or so, I believe the convulsions in the data system would never die down—oscillation would continue indefinitely."

Incidentally, it is quite lawful for anyone to have several Social Security numbers; also, for many purposes, there is nothing illicit about using a pseudonym. How the data banks would cope with a widespread rebellion, only the god of the computers knows.

Mr. Berkeley proposes, however, that before resorting to such tactics, the friends of privacy should seek the passage of laws restricting the use of data files in some ways and opening those files in other ways. He would establish the

following rights for anyone whose name has got into a data bank:

The right to read what is maintained in any file kept about you by the FBI, or the CIA, or any credit bureau, or any other agency which compiles information about you.

The right to inform the agency of errors.

The right to compel the changing of untrue information about you.

The right to compel the removal of irrelevant information about you.

Although I sympathize generally with these claims, I cannot go all the way with Mr. Berkeley. It would be all very well, for instance, for an innocent person to have access to information about himself in the files of police agencies. But not everybody is innocent.

If a criminal were permitted access to such files about himself, not only might detection and prosecution of his activities become almost impossible, but he might retaliate on anyone who had supplied information about him.

In England, Lord Halsbury, the president of the Council of the British Computer Society, writes that there is an urgent need for "file security." He advocates "an automatic right of print-out" for every person on whom computerized records are kept by agencies of government. "You cannot send people to prison because the computer says so; there has to be a better reason than that." Some records should not go on the computer at all, the Earl of Halsbury continues:

"There are, of course, certain matters which it is very proper to keep secret. The whole system of references and referees depends on security between the referee and the potential employer to whom the reference is addressed." Such secret records should be kept by the conventional means, however they

should not be computerized and easily available to all sorts of people.

"At this stage of our knowledge nothing should go on a computer unless we are prepared to grant the person to whom the computer records relate the right of print-out."

In Canada, Professor Calvin Gottlieb, of the Department of Computer Science at the University of Toronto, declares that "eventually, the only satisfactory solution will be to attach security tags to every data field and use these tags to determine under what conditions the information may be disseminated." He knows that the cost of regulating and licensing information systems would be high but advocates such regulation:

"Experience has shown that overprotection is, in fact, very rare. In my opinion, if the problems regarding protection of individual privacy are explained to the public and to those responsible for political and legislative action and the alternatives are set out, they will be willing to pay the price of keeping our social environment healthy."

Until—if ever—such protections for the privacy of data banks are established, gentle reader, you and I ought to be cautious about scribbling down information about ourselves for the use of other folk. However innocent our activities, it may be imprudent to become the defenseless subject of somebody else's computerized dossier.

CIA recruiting game

STATINTL

There was a time when the CIA could overthrow governments, finance military dictators and run airlines all in secret. When anyone made accusations against this venerable American institution everyone scoffed and carried on believing that it was a small intelligence agency similar to the ones every nation maintains.

That was the way it was. Today it admits to having financed anti-government guerrilla troops in Laos, shady dealings in Cambodia, and its former members openly admit that the CIA did indeed overthrow the Jacobo Arbenz government in Guatemala and the Mossadegh government in Iran.

But the CIA is still at it. At the recent Seventh Congress of the International Organization of Journalists in Havana, Panamanian journalist Baltasar Aispurua told how he had been trained by the CIA to spy on the conference and report on Cuban and other socialist press agencies.

Aispurua's story reads like a perfect James Bond movie, with fat little bureaucrats and addresses in Mexico and Miami—except that it is true. Along with his presentation of the history of his CIA training, Aispurua showed the radio he was given to send messages to Mexico, a jacket with a false lining in which he was supposed to carry his coded reports.

According to Aispurua, he was first contacted by a CIA agent named Francisco Colon in December of 1968. Colon told him the CIA was interested in him because of his expertise on Cuban affairs. Aispurua was also told "we can solve any economic problem or any other kind of problem you may have."

When the agent returned three days later, Aispurua agreed to work with the CIA.

He was visited the next day by Colon, this time accompanied by "a Yankee" named Rojer, who took over from that point.

Rojer took him to a suite in the Las Vegas building, behind the Hotel Panama. Rojer and another American named Al interviewed him at length. Questions asked in the interview included, "What is your favorite color? What is your favorite form of entertainment? and What kind of women do you like? [Aispurua is married]. Would you like a house and a car and to be able to give good things to your children? What would you like to be? What are your philosophical beliefs on how to make the world a better place? and Can you adapt to living outside of your country?"

When contacted, Aispurua was underground as he had been involved in leftist activities on Panama before the October 1968 coup.

In January 1969, together with Al, Aispurua was introduced to an old man "apparently a Filipino, who was just introduced as Dr. Garay, who had just arrived from Washington. Garay was a fat man of medium height, balding, with a mustache.

using a lie detector which Garay said had not failed in the 20 years he had been using it. Aispurua passed.

Before leaving Panama, he was trained in secret writing, receiving and decoding radio messages "which sent coded messages at a rate of 125 groups per second."

And of course what would the CIA be without an ousted Rican bureaucrat? The classes were given by a man of 50 named Adolfo who had held a high-ranking post in the field of Cuba-U.S. shipping before fleeing the country in the wake of Batista's speedy withdrawal.

After training Aispurua was taken around the world apparently for a first hand look at the Spanish-speaking Who's Who in the CIA.

He was treated with special cordiality by the then director of Costa Rican immigration, who is now in the leadership of the right-wing Free Costa Rica Movement (MCR). He then went to Colombia where Al gave him his superspy radio, the jacket containing the codes, the money for his trips, and the carbon paper on which he was to send his messages.

This was also the time when he was told what his objectives were on the Cuba mission.

He was to find out where the missile sites were (if any), check into the private lives of revolutionary leaders, discover any unreported economic reports on Cuba and try to make secret agreements with the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party.

From Colombia he went to Cuba, with stops in San Juan, Caracas, and Madrid on the way. He finally arrived in Cuba April 7, 1969, whereupon he immediately proceeded to spill the beans on the latest CIA attempt to find out what the people see in Fidel Castro.

Aispurua greeted his would-be victims with the statement, "I have come to Cuba, but I am an agent recruited by the CIA as part of its plans to obtain information for its eventual aggression against Cuba."

Aispurua began his presentation by explaining the element the CIA computers seemed to have omitted is that which lets a revolutionary stand by his cause even in the face of offers of money, a house or a car.

Said Aispurua, "My revolutionary ideas won out in order for me to be here today, on my own responsibility, but with the absolute satisfaction of having acted honestly, exposing how imperialism tries to buy hearts and minds and attack the Cuban revolution—and with it the Latin American revolution—and how imperialism underestimates those of us who devote our lives to the struggles of the people."

Dr. Garay, who had just arrived from Washington, was a fat man of medium height, balding, with a mustache. He conducted a three-hour security interview

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THE PROBLEM OF INTELLIGENCE

Story Behind Raid on Son Tay Prison

BY STUART H. LOORY

Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—When Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird testified that the Administration had no way of knowing for certain that American prisoners would be found at Son Tay last November, he was understating an intelligence problem that gives American military planners the shivers.

Among all the other problems of fighting the war in Indochina, the problem of divining the intentions, plans and movements of the North Vietnamese has been the toughest.

That problem made the commando raid on the small compound only 23 miles west of Hanoi one of the biggest gambles in American military history—a gamble decided on by President Nixon for trying to get captured Americans out of North Vietnam but also for what one high Administration official has called "transcendent reasons."

Officially, the Son Tay raid was conducted for one reason only—to rescue American prisoners. Transcendent reasons are admitted only for the deepest background. But since the Administration admitted they existed, others have been speculating on what they might have been.

Idea No. 1: The American military machine, caught in a "dirty, grubby war" that no one wants, scarred by the tragedies at My Lai and stories of other atrocities, condemned at home and facing serious dissension in the field, needed an act of heroism to boost its morale.

Idea No. 2: The Nixon Administration, having helped create a prisoner-of-war lobby since grown impressively vocal, felt the political need to respond to its demands that something be done for the 339 Americans living under cruel conditions in North Vietnam.

Idea No. 3: The President had to show the North Vietnamese that they could not count on using the prisoners as hostages for a political settlement embarrassing to the United States, and that he would take

steps as drastic as invading North Vietnam to secure their freedom.

The President's gamble failed. To understand why, follow it from its inception late last May in a little-known office on the ninth corridor of the Pentagon's first floor.

Office 1E862 is marked "SACSA." The acronym stands for Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities.

It was SACSA that conceived, planned, organized and oversaw the Son Tay operation.

SACSA is both a military officer and the office he directs. The officer, at the time the Son Tay raid was conceived, was Brig. Gen. Donald Dunwoody Blackburn, a 54-year-old infantryman whose career has such great storybook qualities that it has been the subject of a book and a movie—"Blackburn's Headhunters."

As a first lieutenant, Blackburn arrived in the Philippines in October, 1941, to become an adviser to the Philippine army. The following April he evaded capture by the Japanese on Bataan Peninsula, disappeared into the jungles of northern Luzon, organized a small guerrilla force of primitive tribesmen who were just beyond the practice of headhunting and fought a backwoods campaign against the Japanese until the war ended.

Blackburn became one of the recognized experts in "special warfare," the military's euphemism for American involvement in protecting friendly governments against incipient revolution.

In 1957, when the 1954 Geneva accords which settled the French Indochina war were being honored mostly in the breach by all involved, Blackburn joined the American military assistance advisory group in South Vietnam to help shore up the Saigon government of Ngo Dinh Diem against the then-budding Viet Cong insurgency.

In August, 1969, after a series of assignments in the United States and Vietnam, Blackburn was named SACSA.

President John F. Kennedy early in his administration to systematize the United States' role in dealing with insurgencies throughout the world.

Special Warfare Bible

SACSA's doctrine was originally set out in a three-inch thick volume that became the bible of special warfare. Originally that bible dealt mostly with counterinsurgency.

The early counterinsurgency doctrine was based on the simple premise that American technology—the same know-how that would land a man on the moon and create a machine-aided life of comfort for consumers—would conquer insurgencies.

To gain superiority over a guerrilla who has lived in a region for years, you need only fight him in the dark, provided you can see and he cannot, the doctrine said. So radios were developed to penetrate the jungle canopy, helicopters that fly 80 m.p.h. over areas where guerrillas move on foot were brought in. Heat-seeking infrared sensors for detecting enemy campfires were developed.

The enemy found it relatively simple to deal with Western technology. Learning of the campfire detectors, for example, he simply ordered no campfires could be built within a mile of camp, and that rendered infrared sensors relatively useless.

So the insurgency in South Vietnam, instead of being brought under control, developed into the longest war the United States has ever fought. The few thousand American advisers of the early 1960s grew into a force of over half a million ground troops.

By the time Blackburn established himself in the Pentagon's Room 1E862, counterinsurgency had passed its heyday.

Thinks About Contribution

Last May, as concern over the fate of American war prisoners in North Vietnam was rising throughout the country, and the military, Blackburn began to think about what contribution his office could make.

Blackburn studied what was then known of Son Tay and the other known North Vietnamese POW camps and decided that, if prisoners were held at Son Tay, it was the only location where a raiding party could land. The other known prisons are all in downtown Hanoi.

In June, he presented the idea of liberating some American prisoners to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and received permission to conduct a "feasibility study."

"The initial phase started in June," Blackburn told "The Times." "We really wanted to satisfy ourselves on the American prisoners..."

continued

THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

[Book* review by V. I. Vladimirov; Moscow, USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology, Russian, No 2, February 1971, pp 84-88]

STATINTL

STATINTL

Harry Howe Ransom's book The Intelligence Establishment is a revised edition of the monograph also written by him entitled Central Intelligence and National Security, which was published back in 1958. Studying the problem of the organization and activity of the intelligence apparatus over the course of many years, the author sets out significant material whose authenticity does not evoke doubts in American critics although the facts and, especially, the figures are given with great care and are accompanied by a number of reservations.

The present state of the intelligence establishment is presented in the book against the background of American intelligence's development, beginning with the times preceding World War II, when such miserly means were allocated to maintaining U.S. military attaches abroad that only well-to-do people consented to this work, and only after Pearl Harbor and the U.S. entry into World War II was an independent intelligence organization -- the Office of Strategic Services -- created in Washington.

At present the U.S. intelligence establishment, which was lifted up on the crest of the "Cold War," has grown and spread into a mighty complex exerting a substantial influence upon the U.S. foreign policy course. Four billion dollars are allocated to intelligence annually. More than 100,000 people are engaged in the organizations of the "intelligence community." Formally entered in this "community" are: the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the intelligence services of the Defense Department, the State Department, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The U.S. Information Agency and the Agency for International Development cooperate with them, but without formal representation in the interdepartmental organs. Such "think tanks" as the Institute for Defense Analysis and the Rand Corporation, which is linked with the U.S. Air Force, work in intelligence outside the "community." In addition, the majority of U. S. departments, independently of their regular functions, have created their own intelligence apparatus under this or that designation.

* Harry Howe Ransom. The Intelligence Establishment. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1970, xvi plus 309 pages.

Modern and advanced equipment from electronic deciphering machines to spy satellites equipped with modern apparatus which makes it possible to photograph objects on the ground with an exceptional degree of detail and to return the exposed film to given points, has been provided for the intelligence establishment.

All this activity is coordinated and directed by the Central Intelligence Agency. From the time of its inception in 1947, this organization has acquired a sharp anti-Soviet and anti-Communist trend. (In H. Ransom's opinion, this trend is the main factor in the development of the U.S. intelligence apparatus.)